2.2. Comparing the GASB's to the FASB's pension accounting rules
The methodology outlined under GASB 25 and 27 is in direct contrast to the methodology required under Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions. SFAS 87 requires that future benefit
payments be discounted using an interest rate that reflects the rate at which the obligation to pay the pension benefits can
be settled rather than the expected investment return on the pension assets.14 In seeking these rates, the rule further
suggests employers look to “rates of return on high-quality fixed-income investments currently available and expected to be
available during the period to maturity of the pension benefits.” In practice, companies in the U.S. typically use zero-coupon
duration-matched Aa corporate bond rates to determine their pension liability for financial reporting purposes. Using an Aa
rate provides an estimate of the cost of extinguishing the pension liability through the purchase of an annuity contract from
a highly rated insurance company.
The FASB and GASB advocate two different approaches to calculating pension liabilities in part because there are inherent
differences between for-profit and governmental entities, and there are inherent differences in the role of accounting
information and the financial reporting process in these organizations. The FASB's approach is designed to provide an
estimate of the cost of settling the obligation to pay pension benefits through the purchase of an annuity contract.
In contrast, the GASB's approach supports a pension liability calculation that is primarily useful in setting a reasonable
contribution schedule, and allows the use of amortization schedules in the determination of pension assets that mitigate the
volatility in annual contribution requirements. Because of this, the GASB approach does not provide an accurate reflection of
the settlement cost of the pension liability.
We suggest that the FASB settlement cost approach provides a more accurate reflection of the “true costs” of retirement
benefits, consistent with others (e.g., Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011). Therefore, we compare the funding gap calculated under
the FASB's rules to the funding gap calculated under the GASB's rules to derive a measure of the extent to which states’
pension funding gaps are understated. We then decompose this understatement to obtain measures of the discretion used
by states to influence their accounting reports and the extent to which pension understatements are an artifact of the
GASB's rules. We focus on two discretionary elements under GASB rules: the choice of expected returns on assets, and the
amortization of realized and unrealized returns on plan assets.15 After isolating these two discretionary portions of the
understatement of the funding gap, we categorize the remainder of the understatement to be driven by the GASB's rules