The European conception of a state was also
inappropriate in much of the archipelago where a
type of political entity had evolved which enabled
several kingdoms to join together and yet
maintain a fundamentally equal status.
• According to the Portuguese chronicler Joao de
Barros, there were once twenty-nine kingdoms
along the coasts of Sumatra, 'but since we
became involved with these oriental states,
favouring some and suppressing others according
to the way they received us . . . many have been
absorbed to the territory of their most powerful
neighborsTHE CYCLE OF FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY
• 1. One of the major reasons for the tendency to
fragmentation in all Southeast Asian kingdoms
was the difficulty of transferring political power
from one generation to another. The potential for
conflict was particularly great in larger states
where kings were likely to have numerous
children by several women and where the
rewards for success were high. on the death of a
king his brother should inherit the throne, rather
than his son. A practice had also been introduced
of appointing a secondary king, who would be
regarded as heir.• Though Islamic states more clearly identified
the elder son as the legitimate heir, disputes
between a royal prince and his uncles,
younger brothers of the dead ruler, remained
common.
• The very personalized nature of royal
authority meant that the death of a king or a
period of weak rule was often a time of crisis
as princely factions and their supporters
jockeyed for power.
• In this process royal women are commonly
depicted as playing a crucial role. • 2. any decline in general prosperity or even an unusual and
unwelcome event was attributed to supernatural anger at the
failings of the ruler. Sickness, an eclipse, late rainfall, a
volcanic eruption, earthquake, the discovery of a deformed
elephant, disasters like drought or famine, warfare which
maintained a great state placed a heavy burden on peasant
society.
• It was the peasants who supplied the ranks of the armies, it
was their crops and cattle which were seized for supplies, and
it was they who could be carried off by opposing armies to be
sold as slaves in distant lands or to increase the manpower of
rival kings.• As long as The king could command greater
human resources than his rivals he would be
able to maintain his superiority.
• In 1585 and 1586 the heir to the Ayutthaya
throne, Naresuan, was able to rally local forces
and declare his independence from Burma. He
not only strengthened the city's defences but
set in motion reforms which enabled
Ayutthaya to retain a tighter hold over its
subjects. in 1593 meant Ayutthaya was once
again free.• The triumph of Ayutthaya was a reflection of
Burma's fragmentation. Large-scale military
expeditions proved impossible to sustain from
the capital at Pegu, and there was
considerable loss of manpower as villagers
fled to escape military service.
• Just as serious was the fact that the delicate
relationship which Bayinnaung had built up
between different ethnic groups began to fall
apart.• At the end of the sixteenth century certain clear trends
on the mainland can already be seen. Notwithstanding
periods of fragmentation, the basis for future
consolidation in Siam, Burma and Vietnam had been
laid down, and these states had already signaled their
potential for domination over the Lao and Khmer.
• In the island world, however, such trends are not
nearly so apparent. In the Straits of Melaka, Johor,
Aceh and Portuguese controlled Melaka remained at
odds; Java was divided; Brunei was regarded as a
leader in the Borneo region; and Balinese forces were
sufficiently strong to expand into the neighbouring
islands of Lombok and Sumbawa, where they were to
clash with the growing strength of Makassar.• The presence of the Europeans further
complicated the picture.
• The English were soon eclipsed by the newly
formed Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde
Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC), which in 1605
made apparent its intentions of becoming the
pre-eminent European power by capturing the
island of Ambon from the Portuguese. VOC-the
hub of the Dutch trading network
• Certain centres in the archipelago could be
identified as having more commercial power or
greater cultural influence than others, but it was
still very much a poly centric world.THE CENTRES OF POWER IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
• the power of a kingdom came to be determined not merely
by commercial wealth but by the ability to marshal large
numbers of people who could be supported by the
resources of the state itself.
• First, wet-rice can support a far higher population than the
lower-yielding hillside and rain-fed varieties, or the sago
and root crops which were a staple diet in most of the
eastern Indonesian islands. Second, because wet-rice
growers are more sedentary, they are much easier to tie to
a central authority.
• For European governors and Southeast Asian rulers alike,
large settled populations supported by abundant amounts
of food were seen as the key to authority and power.• As much rice as possible was produced. As not
only the maintenance of existing fields but
extension.
• The size of the population any centre could
command had far-reaching political effects.
Amassing the economic resources reinforced
their claims to supremacy over their neighbours.
• In many cases the offer of protection and the
prestige of a powerful patron was no longer
sufficient recompense for the acceptance of a
lower status, since many so-called 'vassals' had
considerable standing of their own.A RENEWAL OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS
CENTRALIZED CONTROL
• By the early seventeenth century, Siam and Burma were reaffirming
their position as the two strongest political and economic powers in
the region. In Ayutthaya Naresuan may have left behind a relatively
strong core but the Thais still felt threatened by their neighbours.
• From the 1660s, when wars between Ayutthaya and the Burmese
were renewed, there was a continuing rivalry between them for
control of territory and resources.
• The type of semi-autonomy which had characterized vassal states
two or three centuries before could now be sustained only in the
case of considerable geographical separation. The area of modern
Laos, for instance, was ultimately able to survive because it was
considerably removed from the centres of Burmese and Thai
control, and was shielded by its environment. - Vientiane, Luang
Prabang and Champassak.• The greater reliance on force to create new political
structures was also evident in the island world, where it
had been an integral part of European intrusion into the
area. - In Cebu in 1565 to find their peaceful overtures
rejected, they opened fire on the local settlement.
• In the early years of Spanish colonization natives were
often compelled to submit and accept Christianity, with the
alternative frequently being death or enslavement.
• In the Indonesian areas the Dutch used even more force to
attain their goal of commercial dominance and to provide
'an example' to native kings. With a charter which enabled
it to act virtually as a sovereign state, the power of the VOC
was made dramatically clear within a few years of its
arrival.
• The commercial competition which was a major reason for
the European presence also encouraged local states to
increase their control over people and resources.SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORMS
AND MANPOWER CONTROL
• In Ayutthaya the reforming process had begun
as early as 1569 following the trauma of the
defeat by the Burmese. Naresuan had
strengthened the capital at the expense of the
provinces, and this trend had continued. Some
provincial ruling houses had been almost
eliminated, and considerable provincial
manpower had been taken under royal
control. • The degree of administrative reform which has been traced
in the mainland states is far less apparent in the
archipelago. By the 1680s a Persian visitor described Aceh
as a collection of satrapies, where 'every corner shelters a
separate king or governor and all the local rulers maintain
themselves independently and do not pay tribute to any
higher authority'.
• A number of reasons can be put forward for the slower rate
of centralization in the island world and the greater
difficulty in controlling populations. Geographic differences
provide one obvious contrast.
• A second problem was the semi-nomadic nature of many
societies which was particularly marked in maritime
Southeast Asia. Those Javanese living in areas producing
wet-rice may have been relatively more settled than
peoples in other areas, but movement both internally and
to other islands was still common.• A further complication in the Indonesian
archipelago was that native states were now
competing for manpower and resources with
the expanding presence of the VOC.
• Throughout the rest of the archipelago the
Dutch were also discovering that it was almost
impossible to pursue commercial goals
without involvement in regional affairs, an
involvement which was made the more likely
by the lodges and factories established
wherever the VOC saw commercial
opportunities.THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
• None of the great centres of the seventeenth century survived into
modern times. By the early 1800s new dynasties ruled in Burma, Siam and
Vietnam; in the island world Banten and Makassar had both lost their
status as independent entrepots, Mataram was divided into two, and Aceh
had been torn by two generations of civil strife.
• In tracing the reasons for these developments in mainland Southeast Asia,
it could be argued that the very process of centralization contained within
itself the seeds of fragmentation.
• Only a powerful centre could maintain its position in the face of the
cumulative tensions induced by continuing