Some scholars long ago emphasized the strong role of patron-client ties in Southeast Asian politics. We sometimes refer to these ties as “patrimonialism”. Form his deep empirical analysis of the region, James C. Scott argued that dyadic ties between a patron and several clients was a strong feature of socio-political relations form the village to the national level. Typically, a patron nurtures loyalty and commitment form followers by providing resources, sometimes protection, or a safety-net when they are faced with difficult times. In return, “clients” remain loyal and commit to supporting these “patrons”. In villages, for example, a wealthy landowner might help poorer farmers needing additional money to fund a large wedding or a funeral. In exchange, the landowner will later ask them to return the favour. In politics, patron-client relations might mean that, in exchange for resources, clients will support a local patron who requires their vote or the support for a particular political party. Political leaders might nurture loyalty form individuals in the armed forces, a political party, or other influential positions by providing some benefits in exchange for their support. An authoritarian lead might help provide resources to loyal generals, politicians or businesspeople in exchange for their support of the regime (Scott, 1972). While we can observe patron-client ties in a broad number of societies, when they become widespread and almost systemic, they need to be placed much more centrally within our understanding of politics. We refer to this kind of phenomenon as patrimonialism when the web of these kinds of dyadic relationships is sufficiently widespread that it becomes part of the character of a society, a state, economic sectors or certain segments of the polity.