Continued characterizations of a negotiator as weak or soft, or as someone who sells out, may lead to unfortunate but predictable outcomes. First, the negotiator may become increasingly inflexible or retaliatory to demonstrate to the constituency that he or she is capable of defending their interests. Second, the negotiator may try to be a more loyal, committed, and dedicated advocate of the constituency’s best interests. Remarkably, the status level of the agent does not seem to affect the pressures. One might expect that high-status agents would believe that they had more flexibility and autonomy to decide what was best for their constituents. However, there is no strong evidence that high-status members of a group (e.g., senior-level managers or formally designated leaders) actually negotiate more quickly, achieve fewer deadlocks in the negating process, or attain better agreements than low-status members (Klimoski and Ash, 1974; Kogan, Lamm; and Trommsdorf, 1972). As a result, the presence of accountability pressures leads to longer, more time-consuming negotiations than when accountability pressures are absent.