On July 1, 1992, Barings Futures Singapore (BFS) started trading on the Singapore
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Mr. Nicholas Leeson was put in charge of
operations for BFS, with responsibilities both for trading and the accounting and
settlements activities. It was believed to be unnecessary to segregate these functions,
because Leeson and his staff would merely execute orders placed by other Baring Group
companies on behalf of their external clients .2 Later in 1992 this situationgradually changed, because many Japanese institutional investors had set up their own
execution capability in Singapore. As a result, the external client business of Baring
Securities Japan (BSJ) became less viable (Hogan, 1999). To compensate for the loss in
this line of business, BSJ commenced proprietary trading on behalf of the Barings group.
One of the primary trading strategies they implemented was arbitraging baskets of stocks
in the Japanese cash market against Nikkei futures (SR2.10). Initially, these transactions
were executed between the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Osaka Securities
Exchange (OSE), which was the main market for Nikkei futures. However, after the OSE
had implemented tighter restrictions, trading on SIMEX became easier and cheaper. As a
result, BSJ traders asked Leeson to execute Nikkei futures trades on SIMEX .
The trading volume handled by Leeson gradually increased over time and by early 1993,
Leeson was involved in executing proprietary trades as well as trades for the external
clients of the Barings Group.
As a result of these developments, a new business opportunity arose, in which
Leeson would play a major role, i.e. arbitrage trading of the Nikkei futures contract
between SIMEX and the OSE. Apparently, large price differences existed between the
two contracts that were very similar in design. The profits from exploiting such price
differences between exchanges are small and therefore trading volumes tend to be large.
Still, the risks are low, because every long position on one exchange is offset by a short
position on the other. In addition to arbitrage trading, Leeson developed an even more
lucrative activity, namely ‘switching’. As Barings was able to trade in Japan as well as in
Singapore, it could select the cheapest market to execute a client’s order. For example, it
could tell a client it would buy 1000 Nikkei futures contracts in Osaka, while in reality it
made the purchase on SIMEX, where at that moment the price was lower. Barings would
charge the client the price quoted on the OSE or slightly better, which was still worse
than the price in Singapore. The difference meant extra profit for Barings (SR3.9). This
selection of the more profitable location of the two to do business, was referred to as
switching.
The end result of all these activities was that the Structured Products Group,
which includes Leeson’s activities, showed an operating profit over 1994 which was five
times what had been planned for that year. Nobody within Barings questioned theseimpressive figures from a business that should be virtually riskless. In particular in the
Nikkei futures market, headquarters believed it occupied a niche, because Barings were
members of both the OSE and SIMEX and had developed the business, clientele and
reputation to deal in and between those marketsChairman Peter
Baring concluded that “it is not actually terribly difficult to make money in the securities
business”Specifically commenting on Barings’ main profit center,
Leeson’s direct boss in London, Michael Killian, said in February 1995: “That guy is a
turbo arbitrageur