Hundreds of thousands of people have died in the Great Lakes region of Africa over the past four years. Most of them were innocent civilians massacred by armies or militias or decimated by disease or starvation as they fled from danger. These horrors can be traced to intense struggles over power carried out by leaders--struggles involving the politicization of ethnicity and a perverse dynamic of violence and fear. The conflicts have been based in part on intellectual foundations, on mental maps of history.
It is these competing visions of the past--the politics of history--that I explore here. Such inquiry is of more than academic interest in contemporary Rwanda. The debate about the nature of the country's history is central to the process of political reconstruction; the postgenocide government in Kigali has not only to deal with the trauma of a whole people and society, but it also has to consider how its policies will be interpreted within the context of various conceptions of Rwanda's past.
A key element in politicizing ethnic cleavages in the recent history of Rwanda has been the development and propagation of a corporate view of ethnicity.[1] The generalization of blame was dramatically evident in the genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994, when hardliners in the Hutuw dominated government labeled all Tutsi in the country as enemies of the state. The genocide was calculated to exterminate them; the hateful vitriol used against the Tutsi in the press and on radio broadcasts illustrated this thought process.[2] A corporate perception of ethnicity was also evident in the recent massacres of Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) in 1996 and 1997. During and after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, hundreds of thousands of people (mostly Hutu) fled to neighboring countries--primarily Tanzania and Zaire[3]--but some also fled to Burundi and Uganda. For the Tutsi-led government of Rwanda that assumed power in July 1994 after the genocide, the refugee camps in Zaire came to be a particularly irritating problem. Fearing reprisals, most of the refugees refused to return home; meanwhile these camps were being used as bases for guerrilla attacks from Zaire against western Rwanda. Among the refugees in the crowded camps along Zaire's eastern border with Rwanda and Burundi were persons who were certainly guilty of genocide, including former soldiers and officers of the Rwandan armed forces (the Rwandan army of the pre-1994 government) and members of militias such as the Inter ahamwe. They posed a serious threat then, and they still do today. But such individuals constituted perhaps 30,000 to 50,000 people in the camps--5 percent of the total refugee populations. To be sure, others in the camps were indirectly implicated in the genocide, but many were not. Moreover, the majority of refugees in the camps were women and children who were neither major perpetrators of the genocide nor a military threat. In the Goma area, for example, 80 percent of the people in the camps were women and children.
Beginning in October 1996, the camps in Zaire were attacked by troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the army of Rwanda's postgenocide government, with help from soldiers of Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFL). After the camps were destroyed, many of the Rwandan refugees returned to Rwanda. The remaining refugees who also survived attacks against the camps, probably several hundred thousand people, fled west into the mountains and forests of eastern Zaire. During the war in Congo (which was fought not so much against Mobutu's army as against Rwandan refugees), soldiers from the RPA and the ADFL pursued the refugees for months, attacking their small encampments and massacring men, women, and children at will.[4]
An example will illustrate how Hutu were collectively held responsible for the genocide and tracked down, even on foreign soil. In March 1997, more than 100,000 of these refugees found themselves blocked at Ubundu, on the banks of the Congo River. To Immaculee Mukarugwizwa, a widowed former schoolteacher, their prospects seemed grim:
We are hungry and we are sick but above all we have lost all morale. Our elders are shrivelled and dying and our children already look old. Are all of us guilty of genocide, even these little children? We have been chased through the bush like animals. And in three days, Kabila's men will be upon us again, leaving 100,000 of us with a choice of death under their bombs or in the jaws of crocodiles.[5]
A corporate view of ethnicity, which targeted all Tutsi during the genocide, was also used in this case to label all Hutu refugees as genocidaires (persons who helped perpetrate genocide), and this view seemed to be part of a political program of vengeance directed against Hutu. In deploring the tendency to globalize blame for the genocide in Rwanda to all Hutu, the former schoolteacher Mukarugwizwa's plea highlights a more general perception of ethnicity; such a perception of ethnicity brought with it tragic consequences in the past--and those continue into the present.
In these situations, explaining how and why the uses and abuses of power led to violence in the past could serve as an important lesson to leaders who wish to build a different society in the future. Yet, not surprisingly, in such a polarized atmosphere, historical reconstruction is itself highly contested. Here, with an intensity that surpasses the normal cliches, there is no single history; rather there are competing "histories.
หลายร้อยหลายพันคนได้เสียชีวิตในภาคเกรตเลกส์ของแอฟริกาสี่ปีผ่านมา ส่วนใหญ่จะถูกพลเรือนผู้บริสุทธิ์ massacred โดยกองทัพหรือหนุน หรือ decimated โรคหรือความอดอยากเป็นพวกเขาหนีจากอันตราย สามารถติดตามความน่ากลัวเหล่านี้ไปย่างรุนแรงมากกว่าพลังงานที่ดำเนินการ โดยผู้นำ - ย่าง politicization ชนและไดนามิก perverse ของความรุนแรงและความกลัว ความขัดแย้งได้ถูกใช้ในส่วนบนรากฐานทางปัญญา จิตแผนที่ประวัติศาสตร์วิสัยทัศน์เหล่านี้แข่งขันในอดีต - เมืองประวัติศาสตร์ - ที่ฉันมาที่นี่ได้ คำถามดังกล่าวน่าสนใจกว่าศึกษาในรวันดาร่วมสมัยได้ การอภิปรายเกี่ยวกับลักษณะของประวัติศาสตร์ของประเทศเป็นศูนย์กลางกระบวนการฟื้นฟูการเมือง รัฐบาล postgenocide ในคิกาลีเป็นไม่เท่ากับการบาดเจ็บของทั้งคนและสังคม ได้มีการพิจารณาว่านโยบายจะถูกตีความในบริบทของการ conceptions ต่าง ๆ ของอดีตของรวันดาA key element in politicizing ethnic cleavages in the recent history of Rwanda has been the development and propagation of a corporate view of ethnicity.[1] The generalization of blame was dramatically evident in the genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994, when hardliners in the Hutuw dominated government labeled all Tutsi in the country as enemies of the state. The genocide was calculated to exterminate them; the hateful vitriol used against the Tutsi in the press and on radio broadcasts illustrated this thought process.[2] A corporate perception of ethnicity was also evident in the recent massacres of Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) in 1996 and 1997. During and after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, hundreds of thousands of people (mostly Hutu) fled to neighboring countries--primarily Tanzania and Zaire[3]--but some also fled to Burundi and Uganda. For the Tutsi-led government of Rwanda that assumed power in July 1994 after the genocide, the refugee camps in Zaire came to be a particularly irritating problem. Fearing reprisals, most of the refugees refused to return home; meanwhile these camps were being used as bases for guerrilla attacks from Zaire against western Rwanda. Among the refugees in the crowded camps along Zaire's eastern border with Rwanda and Burundi were persons who were certainly guilty of genocide, including former soldiers and officers of the Rwandan armed forces (the Rwandan army of the pre-1994 government) and members of militias such as the Inter ahamwe. They posed a serious threat then, and they still do today. But such individuals constituted perhaps 30,000 to 50,000 people in the camps--5 percent of the total refugee populations. To be sure, others in the camps were indirectly implicated in the genocide, but many were not. Moreover, the majority of refugees in the camps were women and children who were neither major perpetrators of the genocide nor a military threat. In the Goma area, for example, 80 percent of the people in the camps were women and children.Beginning in October 1996, the camps in Zaire were attacked by troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the army of Rwanda's postgenocide government, with help from soldiers of Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFL). After the camps were destroyed, many of the Rwandan refugees returned to Rwanda. The remaining refugees who also survived attacks against the camps, probably several hundred thousand people, fled west into the mountains and forests of eastern Zaire. During the war in Congo (which was fought not so much against Mobutu's army as against Rwandan refugees), soldiers from the RPA and the ADFL pursued the refugees for months, attacking their small encampments and massacring men, women, and children at will.[4]An example will illustrate how Hutu were collectively held responsible for the genocide and tracked down, even on foreign soil. In March 1997, more than 100,000 of these refugees found themselves blocked at Ubundu, on the banks of the Congo River. To Immaculee Mukarugwizwa, a widowed former schoolteacher, their prospects seemed grim:We are hungry and we are sick but above all we have lost all morale. Our elders are shrivelled and dying and our children already look old. Are all of us guilty of genocide, even these little children? We have been chased through the bush like animals. And in three days, Kabila's men will be upon us again, leaving 100,000 of us with a choice of death under their bombs or in the jaws of crocodiles.[5]A corporate view of ethnicity, which targeted all Tutsi during the genocide, was also used in this case to label all Hutu refugees as genocidaires (persons who helped perpetrate genocide), and this view seemed to be part of a political program of vengeance directed against Hutu. In deploring the tendency to globalize blame for the genocide in Rwanda to all Hutu, the former schoolteacher Mukarugwizwa's plea highlights a more general perception of ethnicity; such a perception of ethnicity brought with it tragic consequences in the past--and those continue into the present.
In these situations, explaining how and why the uses and abuses of power led to violence in the past could serve as an important lesson to leaders who wish to build a different society in the future. Yet, not surprisingly, in such a polarized atmosphere, historical reconstruction is itself highly contested. Here, with an intensity that surpasses the normal cliches, there is no single history; rather there are competing "histories.
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