The same effort to eliminate undedidability and power can be found
in Rawls. Justice as fairness is presented as an acceptable basis for
consensus in a pluralistic society because it is non-partisan and
transcends the different comprehensive views. To be sure, Rawls now
acknowledges that his theory is not transhistorical but is the answer to
a specific question: namely, 'Which conception of justice is most
appropriate for realizing the value of liberty and equality in basic
institutions?' This of course implies that the discussion is going to be
constrained by the premiss that the values of liberty and equality are
the ones to be taken into account. For him, this requirement simply
indicates that we start from the fundamental intuitive ideas present in
our societies. He sees it as self-evident and uncontroversial, but it is
not. Far from being a benign statement of fact, it is the result of a
decision which already excludes from the dialogue those who believe
that different values should be the organizing Ones of the political
order. Rawls, who considers that in our societies those values provide
the criteria of moral reasonableness, rules out their objections. He is
convinced that starting from those basic, reasonable premises, a
process of neutral, rational reasoning leads to the formulation of a
theory of justice that all reasonable and rational people should accept.
In consequence, those who disagree with them are disqualified on the
ground of being either unreasonable or irrational. This represents no
problem for him since he believes that 'political institutions satisfying
the principles of a liberal conception of justice realize political values
and ideas that normally outweigh whatever values oppose them.'
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