Pluralist theory is based on a liberal conception of interests which equates people's interests with expressed preferences. That is, pluralists argue that people's interests are what they say they are, And the nature of these interests may be inferred through observation of political action and inaction. This conception of interests poses at least two difficulties. First, occasions arise when people appear to act or not act in a way which is against their interests. An example taken from the community power literature, would be retailers who fail to oppose urban redevelopment plans that would put them out of business (Polsby, 1980, p. 226). In a case such as this it could be argued that the retailers' real interests were not reflected in their political behaviour. Even more problematic is the second objection to the liberal conception of interests, namely that it does not admit the possibility that a false consensus may exist. in other words, if interests are equated with expressed preferences and a consensus exists, then the assumption must be that the consensus is genuine. Writers who find this conception of interests untenable have sought ways of distinguishing subjective interests from objective or real interests. As a consequence