If the DPRK accepted the U.S. proposal, its survival would depend on the fulfillment of promises coming from a government dedicated to its destruction. Far from surprising, Pyongyang rejected the “sham offer” and countered with “reward for freeze” or receipt of oil and aid before gradual movement toward CVID. In July, North Korean leaders told Harrison and Gregg that its proposal now included a requirement for excluding references to HEU and serious steps toward normalization.84 Following U.S. rejection, Pyongyang added as conditions that Washington provide energy aid, lift economic sanctions, and delist the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism. North Korea also publicly warned that it might stage a test explosion of a nuclear device. Meanwhile, cooperation between Pyongyang and Seoul continued, as the two Koreas signed agreements on a mutual end to propaganda against one another and steps to avoid military clashes at the DMZ. Japan and the ROK also continued to invest in the DPRK’s economy. Further upsetting the Bush administration, the PRC was questioning the validity of U.S. evidence that North Korea had an HEU program, not least because of its fabrications regarding Iraq. Early in 2005, Washington presented evidence to Beijing that Libya had received nuclear material from North Korea, arguing that since it had the signature of no other known producer; it had to have come from Pyongyang. On 20 March, the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration had misrepresented intelligence on the supposed transfer, as it had done to support claims of WMDs in Iraq.85