This study provides evidence on the relation between the distribution of share ownership and corporate value. On the whole, the evidence suggests that the make up of the ownership structure of a firm is an important factor in the corporate governance process. The primary premise of this study is twofold. First, simply examining the overall shareholding by institutional investors does not consider the level of monitoring exercised by these investors. Because the case for enhancing firm value rests on the argument that institutional and corporate investors engage in close monitoring it is important to segregate institutional and corporate investors that do and do not engage in active monitoring. Institutions with board representation are active investors and in this study those without board representation are treated as passive investors. Second, the paper argues that active investors, similar to insiders, may behave differently at higher ownership levels. That is, the level of investment held by active investors may have a non-linear relation with corporate value.
The results of the study are consistent with the above predictions. First, shareholding by active institutional investors of up to 30 per cent improves the value of the firm. Holdings beyond 30 per cent reduce the value of the firm confirming a significant non-linear relation with corporate value. second, shareholdings by insiders of up to 30 per cent increase firm value. After that point the value of the firm decreases. This non-linear relation is consistent with results reported in prior research. Additionally, consistent with the prediction, no evidence is found to support that the shareholdings by transient institutional investors have a non-linear relation with firm value.