The focus on capital market reforms as the dependent variable in this book is useful and interesting for several reasons. In the first place, the past two decades have witnessed increasingly intensified efforts at reforming capital markets across developing countries. Recurrent financial crises and resultant socio-economic instabilities notwithstanding, many developing country governments have continued with capital market reforms and, in fact, expanded their reform programmes (de la Torre et al. 2007; Litan et al. 2003). Continued reforms have transformed national financial architectures, reshaped the role of capital markets in the process of financial development and altered the ways in which of the most fiercely governments orchestrate resource allocation. Some of the most fiercely fought political battles in developing countries have been about the welfare and distributional impact of capital market reforms. Despite the significant economic and political implications of capital market reforms, the large and growing literature on the policy effects of political parties has been dedicated to the study of fiscal adjustments, trade liberalization and exchange rate policies. This book uses capital market reforms to interrogate the literature a more importantly, to explore the extent to which political parties influence financial policy processes and outcome.