In an average year about 20,000 hom

In an average year about 20,000 homicides occur in the United States. Fewer than 300 convicted murderers are sentenced to death. But because no more than thirty murderers have been executed in any recent year, most convicts sentenced to death are likely to die of old age (1). Nonetheless, the death penalty looms large in discussions: it raises important moral questions independent of the number of executions (2).The death penalty is our harshest punishment (3). It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished, instead of temporarily imprisoning them. Further, although not intended to cause physical pain, execution is the only corporal punishment still applied to adults (4). These singular characteristics contribute to the perennial, impassioned controversy about capital punishment.I. DISTRIBUTIONConsideration of the justice, morality, or usefulness, of capital punishment is often conflated with objections to its alleged discriminatory or capricious distribution among the guilty. Wrongly so. If capital punishment is immoralin se, no distribution cannot affect the quality of what is distributed, be it punishments or rewards. Discriminatory or capricious distribution thus could not justify abolition of the death penalty. Further, maldistribution inheres no more in capital punishment than in any other punishment.Maldistribution between the guilty and the innocent is, by definition, unjust. But the injustice does not lie in the nature of the punishment. Because of the finality of the death penalty, the most grievous maldistribution occurs when it is imposed upon the innocent. However, the frequent allegations of discrimination and capriciousness refer to maldistribution among the guilty and not to the punishment of the innocent (5).Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserves it is irrelevant to its justice or morality. Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital offenses suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally guilty of the same crimes do not, a more equal distribution, however desirable, would merely be more equal. It would not be more just to the convicts under sentence of death.Punishments are imposed on person, not on racial or economic groups. Guilt is personal. The only relevant question is: does the person to be executed deserve the punishment? Whether or not others who deserved the same punishment, whatever their economic or racial group, have avoided execution is irrelevant. If they have, the guilt if the executed convicts would not be diminished, nor would their punishment be less deserved. To put the issue starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks, but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed on others (6).Equality, in short, seems morally less important than justice. And justice is independent of distributional inequalities. The ideal of equal justice demands that justice be equally distributed, not that it be replace by equality. Justice requires that as many of the guilty as possible be punished, regardless of whether others have avoided punishment. To let these others escape the deserved punishment does not do justice to them, or to society. But it is not unjust to those who could not escape.These moral considerations are not meant to deny that irrational discrimination, or capriciousness, would be inconsistent with constitutional requirements. But I am satisfied that the Supreme Court has in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional requirement of equality as much as is possible. Some inequality is indeed unavoidable as a practical matter in any system (7). But, ultra posse nemo obligatur. (Nobody is bound beyond ability)(8).Recent data reveal little direct racial discrimination in the sentencing of those arrested and convicted of murder. (9) The abrogation of the death penalty for rape has eliminated a major source of racial discrimination. Concededly, some discrimination based on the race of murder victims may exist; yet, this discrimination affects criminal murder victimizers in an unexpected way. Murderers of whites are thought more likely to be executed than murderers of blacks. Black victims, then, are less fully vindicated than white ones. However, because most black murderers kill blacks, black murderers are spared the death penalty more often than are white murderers. They fare better than most white murderers (10). The motivation behind unequal distribution of the death penalty may well have been to discriminate against blacks, but the result has favored them. Maldistribution is thus a straw man for empirical as well as analytical reasons.II. MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICEIn a recent survey Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael Radelet found that 7000 persons were executed in the United States between 1900 and 1985 and that 35 were innocent of capital crimes (11). Among the innocents they list Sacco and Vanzetti as well as Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Although their data may be questionable, I do not doubt that, over a long enough period, miscarriages of justice will occur even in capital cases.Despite precautions, nearly all human activities, such as trucking, lighting, or construction, cost the lives of some innocent bystanders. We do not give up these activities, because the advantages, moral or material, outweigh the unintended losses (12). Analogously, for those who think the death penalty just, miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and the usefulness of doing justice. For those who think death penalty unjust even when it does not miscarry, miscarriages can hardly be decisive.III. DETERRENCEDespite much recent work, there has been no conclusive statistical demonstration that the death penalty is a better deterrent than are alternative punishments (13). However, deterrence is less than decisive for either side. Most abolitionists acknowledge that they would continue to favor abolition even if the death penalty were shown to deter more murders than alternatives could deter (14). Abolitionists appear to value the life of a convicted murderer or, at least, his non-execution, more highly than they value the lives of the innocent victims who might be spared by deterring prospective murderers.Deterrence is not altogether decisive for me either. I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it were shown that the threat of execution could not deter prospective murderers not already deterred by the threat of imprisonment (15). Still, I believe the death penalty, because of its finality, is more feared than imprisonment, and deters some prospective murderers not deterred by the thought of imprisonment. Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is more important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because o the possibility, or even the probability, tht executing them would not deter others. Whereas the live of the victims who might be saved are valuable, that of the murderer has only negative value, because of his crime. Surely the criminal law is meant to protect the lives of potential victims in preference to those of actual murderers.Murder rates are determined by many factors; neither the severity nor the probability of the threatened sanction is always decisive. However, for the long run, I share the view of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: "Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged (16)" Penal sanctions are useful in the long run for the formation of the internal restraints so necessary to control crime. The severity and finality of the death penalty is appropriate to the seriousness and the finality of murder (17).IV. INCIDENTAL ISSUES: COST, RELATIVESUFFERING, BRUTALIZATIONMany nondecisive issues are associated with capital punishment. Some believe that the monetary cost of appealing a capital sentence is excessive (18). Yet most comparisons of the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of execution, apart from their dubious relevance, are flawed at least by the implied assumption that life prisoners will generate no judicial costs during their imprisonment. At any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of doing justice.Others insist that a person sentenced to death suffers more than his victim suffered, and that this (excess) suffering is undue according to the lex talionis (rule of retaliation) (19). We cannot know whether the murderer on death row suffers more than his victim suffered; however, unlike the murderer, the victim deserved none of the suffering inflicted. Further, the limitations of the lex talionis were meant to restrain private vengeance, not the social retribution that has taken its place. Punishment-- regardless of the motivation-- is not intended to revenge, offset, or compensate for the victim's suffering, or to measured by it. Punishment is to vindicate the law and the social order undermined by the crime. This is why a kidnapper's penal confinement is not limited to the period for which he imprisoned his victim; nor is a burglar's confinement meant merely to offset the suffering or the harm he caused his victim; nor is it meant only to offset the advantage he gained (20).Another argument heard at least since Beccaria (21) is that, by killing a murderer, we encourage, endorse, or legitimize unlawful killing Yet, although all punishments are meant to be unpleasant, it is seldom argued that they legitimize the unlawful imposition of identical unpleasantness. Imprisonment is not thought to legitimize kidnapping; neither are fines though

In an average year about 20,000 homicides occur in the United States. Fewer than 300 convicted murderers are sentenced to death. But because no more than thirty murderers have been executed in any recent year, most convicts sentenced to death are likely to die of old age (1). Nonetheless, the death penalty looms large in discussions: it raises important moral questions independent of the number of executions (2).The death penalty is our harshest punishment (3). It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished, instead of temporarily imprisoning them. Further, although not intended to cause physical pain, execution is the only corporal punishment still applied to adults (4). These singular characteristics contribute to the perennial, impassioned controversy about capital punishment.I. DISTRIBUTIONConsideration of the justice, morality, or usefulness, of capital punishment is often conflated with objections to its alleged discriminatory or capricious distribution among the guilty. Wrongly so. If capital punishment is immoralin se, no distribution cannot affect the quality of what is distributed, be it punishments or rewards. Discriminatory or capricious distribution thus could not justify abolition of the death penalty. Further, maldistribution inheres no more in capital punishment than in any other punishment.Maldistribution between the guilty and the innocent is, by definition, unjust. But the injustice does not lie in the nature of the punishment. Because of the finality of the death penalty, the most grievous maldistribution occurs when it is imposed upon the innocent. However, the frequent allegations of discrimination and capriciousness refer to maldistribution among the guilty and not to the punishment of the innocent (5).Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserves it is irrelevant to its justice or morality. Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital offenses suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally guilty of the same crimes do not, a more equal distribution, however desirable, would merely be more equal. It would not be more just to the convicts under sentence of death.Punishments are imposed on person, not on racial or economic groups. Guilt is personal. The only relevant question is: does the person to be executed deserve the punishment? Whether or not others who deserved the same punishment, whatever their economic or racial group, have avoided execution is irrelevant. If they have, the guilt if the executed convicts would not be diminished, nor would their punishment be less deserved. To put the issue starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks, but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed on others (6).Equality, in short, seems morally less important than justice. And justice is independent of distributional inequalities. The ideal of equal justice demands that justice be equally distributed, not that it be replace by equality. Justice requires that as many of the guilty as possible be punished, regardless of whether others have avoided punishment. To let these others escape the deserved punishment does not do justice to them, or to society. But it is not unjust to those who could not escape.These moral considerations are not meant to deny that irrational discrimination, or capriciousness, would be inconsistent with constitutional requirements. But I am satisfied that the Supreme Court has in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional requirement of equality as much as is possible. Some inequality is indeed unavoidable as a practical matter in any system (7). But, ultra posse nemo obligatur. (Nobody is bound beyond ability)(8).Recent data reveal little direct racial discrimination in the sentencing of those arrested and convicted of murder. (9) The abrogation of the death penalty for rape has eliminated a major source of racial discrimination. Concededly, some discrimination based on the race of murder victims may exist; yet, this discrimination affects criminal murder victimizers in an unexpected way. Murderers of whites are thought more likely to be executed than murderers of blacks. Black victims, then, are less fully vindicated than white ones. However, because most black murderers kill blacks, black murderers are spared the death penalty more often than are white murderers. They fare better than most white murderers (10). The motivation behind unequal distribution of the death penalty may well have been to discriminate against blacks, but the result has favored them. Maldistribution is thus a straw man for empirical as well as analytical reasons.II. MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICEIn a recent survey Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael Radelet found that 7000 persons were executed in the United States between 1900 and 1985 and that 35 were innocent of capital crimes (11). Among the innocents they list Sacco and Vanzetti as well as Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Although their data may be questionable, I do not doubt that, over a long enough period, miscarriages of justice will occur even in capital cases.Despite precautions, nearly all human activities, such as trucking, lighting, or construction, cost the lives of some innocent bystanders. We do not give up these activities, because the advantages, moral or material, outweigh the unintended losses (12). Analogously, for those who think the death penalty just, miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and the usefulness of doing justice. For those who think death penalty unjust even when it does not miscarry, miscarriages can hardly be decisive.III. DETERRENCEDespite much recent work, there has been no conclusive statistical demonstration that the death penalty is a better deterrent than are alternative punishments (13). However, deterrence is less than decisive for either side. Most abolitionists acknowledge that they would continue to favor abolition even if the death penalty were shown to deter more murders than alternatives could deter (14). Abolitionists appear to value the life of a convicted murderer or, at least, his non-execution, more highly than they value the lives of the innocent victims who might be spared by deterring prospective murderers.Deterrence is not altogether decisive for me either. I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it were shown that the threat of execution could not deter prospective murderers not already deterred by the threat of imprisonment (15). Still, I believe the death penalty, because of its finality, is more feared than imprisonment, and deters some prospective murderers not deterred by the thought of imprisonment. Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is more important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because o the possibility, or even the probability, tht executing them would not deter others. Whereas the live of the victims who might be saved are valuable, that of the murderer has only negative value, because of his crime. Surely the criminal law is meant to protect the lives of potential victims in preference to those of actual murderers.Murder rates are determined by many factors; neither the severity nor the probability of the threatened sanction is always decisive. However, for the long run, I share the view of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: "Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged (16)" Penal sanctions are useful in the long run for the formation of the internal restraints so necessary to control crime. The severity and finality of the death penalty is appropriate to the seriousness and the finality of murder (17).IV. INCIDENTAL ISSUES: COST, RELATIVESUFFERING, BRUTALIZATIONMany nondecisive issues are associated with capital punishment. Some believe that the monetary cost of appealing a capital sentence is excessive (18). Yet most comparisons of the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of execution, apart from their dubious relevance, are flawed at least by the implied assumption that life prisoners will generate no judicial costs during their imprisonment. At any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of doing justice.Others insist that a person sentenced to death suffers more than his victim suffered, and that this (excess) suffering is undue according to the lex talionis (rule of retaliation) (19). We cannot know whether the murderer on death row suffers more than his victim suffered; however, unlike the murderer, the victim deserved none of the suffering inflicted. Further, the limitations of the lex talionis were meant to restrain private vengeance, not the social retribution that has taken its place. Punishment-- regardless of the motivation-- is not intended to revenge, offset, or compensate for the victim's suffering, or to measured by it. Punishment is to vindicate the law and the social order undermined by the crime. This is why a kidnapper's penal confinement is not limited to the period for which he imprisoned his victim; nor is a burglar's confinement meant merely to offset the suffering or the harm he caused his victim; nor is it meant only to offset the advantage he gained (20).Another argument heard at least since Beccaria (21) is that, by killing a murderer, we encourage, endorse, or legitimize unlawful killing Yet, although all punishments are meant to be unpleasant, it is seldom argued that they legitimize the unlawful imposition of identical unpleasantness. Imprisonment is not thought to legitimize kidnapping; neither are fines though

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In an average year about 20,000 homicides occur in the United States. Fewer than 300 convicted murderers are sentenced to death. But because no more than thirty murderers have been executed in any recent year, most convicts sentenced to death are likely to die of old age (1). Nonetheless, the death penalty looms large in discussions: it raises important moral questions independent of the number of executions (2).The death penalty is our harshest punishment (3). It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished, instead of temporarily imprisoning them. Further, although not intended to cause physical pain, execution is the only corporal punishment still applied to adults (4). These singular characteristics contribute to the perennial, impassioned controversy about capital punishment.I. DISTRIBUTIONConsideration of the justice, morality, or usefulness, of capital punishment is often conflated with objections to its alleged discriminatory or capricious distribution among the guilty. Wrongly so. If capital punishment is immoralin se, no distribution cannot affect the quality of what is distributed, be it punishments or rewards. Discriminatory or capricious distribution thus could not justify abolition of the death penalty. Further, maldistribution inheres no more in capital punishment than in any other punishment.Maldistribution between the guilty and the innocent is, by definition, unjust. But the injustice does not lie in the nature of the punishment. Because of the finality of the death penalty, the most grievous maldistribution occurs when it is imposed upon the innocent. However, the frequent allegations of discrimination and capriciousness refer to maldistribution among the guilty and not to the punishment of the innocent (5).Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserves it is irrelevant to its justice or morality. Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital offenses suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally guilty of the same crimes do not, a more equal distribution, however desirable, would merely be more equal. It wouldnot be more just to the convicts under sentence of death.Punishments are imposed on person, not on racial or economic groups. Guilt is personal. The only relevant question is: does the person to be executed deserve the punishment? Whether or not others who deserved the same punishment, whatever their economic or racial group, have avoided execution is irrelevant. If they have, the guilt if the executed convicts would not be diminished, nor would their punishment be less deserved. To put the issue starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks, but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed on others (6).Equality, in short, seems morally less important than justice. And justice is independent of distributional inequalities. The ideal of equal justice demands that justice be equally distributed, not that it be replace by equality. Justice requires that as many of the guilty as possible be punished, regardless of whether others have avoided punishment. To let these others escape the deserved punishment does not do justice to them, or to society. But it is not unjust to those who could not escape.These moral considerations are not meant to deny that irrational discrimination, or capriciousness, would be inconsistent with constitutional requirements. But I am satisfied that the Supreme Court has in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional requirement of equality as much as is possible. Some inequality is indeed unavoidable as a practical matter in any system (7). But, ultra posse nemo obligatur. (Nobody is bound beyond ability)(8).Recent data reveal little direct racial discrimination in the sentencing of those arrested and convicted of murder. (9) The abrogation of the death penalty for rape has eliminated a major source of racial discrimination. Concededly, some discrimination based on the race of murder victims may exist; yet, this discrimination affects criminal murder victimizers in an unexpected way. Murderers of whites are thought more likely to be executed than murderers of blacks. Black victims, then, are less fully vindicated than white ones. However, because most black murderers kill blacks, black murderers are spared the death penalty more often than are white murderers. They fare better than most white murderers (10). The motivation behind unequal distribution of the death penalty may well have been to discriminate against blacks, but the result has favored them. Maldistribution is thus a straw man for empirical as well as analytical reasons.II. MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICEIn a recent survey Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael Radelet found that 7000 persons were executed in the United States between 1900 and 1985 and that 35 were innocent of capital crimes (11). Among the innocents they list Sacco and Vanzetti as well as Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Although their data may be questionable, I do not doubt that, over a long enough period, miscarriages of justice will occur even in capital cases.Despite precautions, nearly all human activities, such as trucking, lighting, or construction, cost the lives of some innocent bystanders. We do not give up these activities, because the advantages, moral or material, outweigh the unintended losses (12). Analogously, for those who think the death penalty just, miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and the usefulness of doing justice. For those who think death penalty unjust even when it does not miscarry, miscarriages can hardly be decisive.III. DETERRENCEDespite much recent work, there has been no conclusive statistical demonstration that the death penalty is a better deterrent than are alternative punishments (13). However, deterrence is less than decisive for either side. Most abolitionists acknowledge that they would continue to favor abolition even if the death penalty were shown to deter more murders than alternatives could deter (14). Abolitionists appear to value the life of a convicted murderer or, at least, his non-execution, more highly than they value the lives of the innocent victims who might be spared by deterring prospective murderers.Deterrence is not altogether decisive for me either. I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it were shown that the threat of execution could not deter prospective murderers not already deterred by the threat of imprisonment (15). Still, I believe the death penalty, because of its finality, is more feared than imprisonment, and deters some prospective murderers not deterred by the thought of imprisonment. Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is more important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because o the possibility, or even the probability, tht executing them would not deter others. Whereas the live of the victims who might be saved are valuable, that of the murderer has only negative value, because of his crime. Surely the criminal law is meant to protect the lives of potential victims in preference to those of actual murderers.Murder rates are determined by many factors; neither the severity nor the probability of the threatened sanction is always decisive. However, for the long run, I share the view of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: "Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged (16)" Penal sanctions are useful in the long run for the formation of the internal restraints so necessary to control crime. The severity and finality of the death penalty is appropriate to the seriousness and the finality of murder (17).IV. INCIDENTAL ISSUES: COST, RELATIVESUFFERING, BRUTALIZATIONMany nondecisive issues are associated with capital punishment. Some believe that the monetary cost of appealing a capital sentence is excessive (18). Yet most comparisons of the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of execution, apart from their dubious relevance, are flawed at least by the implied assumption that life prisoners will generate no judicial costs during their imprisonment. At any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of doing justice.Others insist that a person sentenced to death suffers more than his victim suffered, and that this (excess) suffering is undue according to the lex talionis (rule of retaliation) (19). We cannot know whether the murderer on death row suffers more than his victim suffered; however, unlike the murderer, the victim deserved none of the suffering inflicted. Further, the limitations of the lex talionis were meant to restrain private vengeance, not the social retribution that has taken its place. Punishment-- regardless of the motivation-- is not intended to revenge, offset, or compensate for the victim's suffering, or to measured by it. Punishment is to vindicate the law and the social order undermined by the crime. This is why a kidnapper's penal confinement is not limited to the period for which he imprisoned his victim; nor is a burglar's confinement meant merely to offset the suffering or the harm he caused his victim; nor is it meant only to offset the advantage he gained (20).Another argument heard at least since Beccaria (21) is that, by killing a murderer, we encourage, endorse, or legitimize unlawful killing Yet, although all punishments are meant to be unpleasant, it is seldom argued that they legitimize the unlawful imposition of identical unpleasantness. Imprisonment is not thought to legitimize kidnapping; neither are fines though

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In an average year about 20,000 homicides occur in the United States. Fewer than 300 convicted murderers are sentenced to death. But because no more than thirty murderers have been executed in any recent year, most convicts sentenced to death are likely to die of old age (1). Nonetheless, the death penalty looms large in discussions: it raises important moral questions independent of the number of executions (2) .The death penalty is our harshest punishment (3). It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished, instead of temporarily imprisoning them. Further, although not intended to cause physical pain, execution is the only corporal punishment still applied to adults (4). These singular characteristics contribute to the perennial, impassioned controversy about capital punishment.I. DISTRIBUTIONConsideration of the justice, morality, or usefulness, of capital punishment is often conflated with objections to its alleged discriminatory or capricious distribution among the guilty. Wrongly so. If capital punishment is immoralin se, no distribution can not affect the quality of what is distributed, be it punishments or rewards. Discriminatory or capricious distribution thus could not justify abolition of the death penalty. Further, maldistribution inheres no more in capital punishment than in any other punishment.Maldistribution between the guilty and the innocent is, by definition, unjust. But the injustice does not lie in the nature of the punishment. Because of the finality of the death penalty, the most grievous maldistribution occurs when it is imposed upon the innocent. However, the frequent allegations of discrimination and capriciousness refer to maldistribution among the guilty and not to the punishment of the innocent (5) .Maldistribution of any punishment among those who deserves it is irrelevant to its justice or morality. Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital offenses suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally guilty of the same crimes do not, a more equal distribution, however desirable, would merely be more equal. It would not be more just to the convicts under sentence of death.Punishments are imposed on person, not on racial or economic groups. Guilt is personal. The only relevant question is: does the person to be executed deserve the punishment? Whether or not others who deserved the same punishment, whatever their economic or racial group, have avoided execution is irrelevant. If they have, the guilt if the executed convicts would not be diminished, nor would their punishment be less deserved. To put the issue starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks, but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause. anyone to be unjustly punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed on others (6) .Equality, in short, seems morally less important than justice. And justice is independent of distributional inequalities. The ideal of equal justice demands that justice be equally distributed, not that it be replace by equality. Justice requires that as many of the guilty as possible be punished, regardless of whether others have avoided punishment. To let these others escape the deserved punishment does not do justice to them, or to society. But it is not unjust to those who could not escape.These moral considerations are not meant to deny that irrational discrimination, or capriciousness, would be inconsistent with constitutional requirements. But I am satisfied that the Supreme Court has in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional requirement of equality as much as is possible. Some inequality is indeed unavoidable as a practical matter in any system (7). But, ultra posse nemo obligatur. (Nobody is bound beyond ability) (8) .Recent data reveal little direct racial discrimination in the sentencing of those arrested and convicted of murder. (9) The abrogation of the death penalty for rape has eliminated a major source of racial discrimination. Concededly, some discrimination based on the race of murder victims may exist; yet, this discrimination affects criminal murder victimizers in an unexpected way. Murderers of whites are thought more likely to be executed than murderers of blacks. Black victims, then, are less fully vindicated than white ones. However, because most black murderers kill blacks, black murderers are spared the death penalty more often than are white murderers. They fare better than most white murderers (10). The motivation behind unequal distribution of the death penalty may well have been to discriminate against blacks, but the result has favored them. Maldistribution is thus a straw man for empirical as well as analytical reasons.II. MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICEIn a recent survey Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael Radelet found that 7000 persons were executed in the United States between 1900 and 1985 and that 35 were innocent of capital crimes (11). Among the innocents they list Sacco and Vanzetti as well as Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Although their data may be questionable, I do not doubt that, over a long enough period, miscarriages of justice will occur even in capital cases.Despite precautions, nearly all human activities, such as trucking, lighting, or construction, cost the lives of. some innocent bystanders. We do not give up these activities, because the advantages, moral or material, outweigh the unintended losses (12). Analogously, for those who think the death penalty just, miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and the usefulness of doing justice. For those who think death penalty unjust even when it does not miscarry, miscarriages can hardly be decisive.III. DETERRENCEDespite much recent work, there has been no conclusive statistical demonstration that the death penalty is a better deterrent than are alternative punishments (13). However, deterrence is less than decisive for either side. Most abolitionists acknowledge that they would continue to favor abolition even if the death penalty were shown to deter more murders than alternatives could deter (14). Abolitionists appear to value the life of a convicted murderer or, at least, his non-execution, more highly than they value the lives of the innocent victims who might be spared by deterring prospective murderers.Deterrence is not altogether decisive for me either. I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it were shown that the threat of execution could not deter prospective murderers not already deterred by the threat of imprisonment (15). Still, I believe the death penalty, because of its finality, is more feared than imprisonment, and deters some prospective murderers not deterred by the thought of imprisonment. Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is more important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because o the possibility, or even the probability, tht executing them would not deter others. Whereas the live of the victims who might be saved are valuable, that of the murderer has only negative value, because of his crime. Surely the criminal law is meant to protect the lives of potential victims in preference to those of actual murderers.Murder rates are determined by many factors; neither the severity nor the probability of the threatened sanction is always decisive. However, for the long run, I share the view of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: "Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with. horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged (16) "Penal sanctions are useful in the long run for the formation of the internal restraints so necessary to control crime. The severity and finality of the death penalty is appropriate to the seriousness and the finality of murder (17) .IV. INCIDENTAL ISSUES: COST, RELATIVESUFFERING, BRUTALIZATIONMany nondecisive issues are associated with capital punishment. Some believe that the monetary cost of appealing a capital sentence is excessive (18). Yet most comparisons of the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of life imprisonment with the cost of execution, apart from their dubious relevance, are flawed at least by the implied assumption that life prisoners will generate no judicial costs during their imprisonment. At any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of doing justice.Others insist that a person sentenced to death suffers more than his victim suffered, and that this (excess) suffering is undue according to the lex talionis (rule of retaliation. ) (19). We can not know whether the murderer on death row suffers more than his victim suffered; however, unlike the murderer, the victim deserved none of the suffering inflicted. Further, the limitations of the lex talionis were meant to restrain private vengeance, not the social retribution that has taken its place. Punishment-- regardless of the motivation-- is not intended to revenge, offset, or compensate for the victim's suffering, or to measured by it. Punishment is to vindicate the law and the social order undermined by the crime. This is why a kidnapper's penal confinement is not limited to the period for which he imprisoned his victim; nor is a burglar's confinement meant merely to offset the suffering or the harm he caused his victim; nor is it meant only to offset the advantage he gained (20) .Another argument heard at least since Beccaria (21) is that, by killing a murderer, we encourage, endorse, or legitimize unlawful killing Yet, although all punishments are meant to. be unpleasant, it is seldom argued that they legitimize the unlawful imposition of identical unpleasantness. Imprisonment is not thought to legitimize kidnapping; neither are fines though

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ในหนึ่งปีเฉลี่ยประมาณ 20 , 000 ฆาตกรรมเกิดขึ้นในสหรัฐอเมริกา น้อยกว่า 300 ข้อหาฆาตกรรมถูกตัดสินให้ประหารชีวิต แต่ไม่เกินสามสิบ ฆาตกร ได้ดำเนินการในช่วงปี ส่วนใหญ่นักโทษที่ถูกตัดสินประหารชีวิตในมีแนวโน้มที่จะตายจากอายุ ( 1 ) อย่างไรก็ตาม การลงโทษประหารชีวิต looms ขนาดใหญ่ในการอภิปราย :มันเพิ่มคำถามสำคัญจริยธรรมอิสระของจำนวนของการประหารชีวิต ( 2 ) การลงโทษประหารชีวิตเป็นการลงโทษที่รุนแรงของเรา ( 3 ) มันเป็นอย่างไร : สิ้นสุดการดำรงอยู่ของผู้ลงโทษแทนชั่วคราว กักขังพวกเขา เพิ่มเติม แต่ไม่ได้มีเจตนาที่จะทำให้เกิดอาการปวดทางกายภาพ การเป็นเพียงการลงโทษยังใช้กับผู้ใหญ่ ( 4 )ลักษณะเหล่านี้ทำให้เอกพจน์ perennial กระตุ้นอารมณ์การโต้เถียงเกี่ยวกับโทษประหารชีวิต ผม distributionconsideration ของความยุติธรรม คุณธรรม หรือประโยชน์ของโทษประหารชีวิตมักผสมรวมกับการคัดค้านข้อกล่าวหาการเลือกปฏิบัติหรือการเอาแต่ใจของความผิด ผิดแล้ว ถ้าการอภัยโทษเป็น immoralin เซทำไมไม่แจกไม่มีผลต่อคุณภาพของสิ่งที่กระจาย ไม่ว่าจะเป็น การลงโทษ หรือให้รางวัล การเลือกปฏิบัติหรือการเอาแต่ใจจึงไม่สามารถปรับการยกเลิกโทษประหาร เพิ่มเติม การแบ่งปันที่ไม่เหมาะสมหรือไม่เพียงพอ inheres ไม่มีบทลงโทษใด ๆอื่น ๆ มากกว่าการลงโทษ การแบ่งปันที่ไม่เหมาะสมหรือไม่เพียงพอระหว่างผิดและบริสุทธิ์ , โดยความหมาย , ไม่ยุติธรรมแต่ความไม่นอนในลักษณะของการลงโทษ เพราะออกมาโทษประหาร การแบ่งปันที่ไม่เหมาะสมหรือไม่เพียงพอสาหัสที่สุดเกิดขึ้นเมื่อมันถูกบังคับให้ผู้บริสุทธิ์ อย่างไรก็ตาม เรื่องของการเลือกปฏิบัติและความไม่แน่นอนที่พบบ่อยหมายถึงการแบ่งปันที่ไม่เหมาะสมหรือไม่เพียงพอในความผิดและการลงโทษของผู้บริสุทธิ์ ( 5 )การแบ่งปันที่ไม่เหมาะสมหรือไม่เพียงพอของการลงโทษของผู้ที่สมควรได้รับมันไม่เกี่ยวข้องกับของความยุติธรรม หรือศีลธรรม ถ้าไม่ดี หรือดำนักโทษมีความผิดความผิดทุนประสบการลงโทษนักโทษอื่น ๆอย่างเท่าเทียมกัน และความผิดของอาชญากรรมเดียวกันไม่ได้ การกระจายเท่าเทียมกันมากขึ้น อย่างไรก็ตาม ที่พึงปรารถนา ก็แค่เท่าเทียมมากขึ้น จะเป็นมากกว่าแค่นักโทษภายใต้ประโยคแห่งความตายการกำหนดในคน ในกลุ่มเชื้อชาติหรือทางเศรษฐกิจ มันเป็นความผิดของบุคคล มีเพียงคำถามที่เกี่ยวข้องคือ : คนที่ถูกประหารสมควรได้รับการลงโทษ ? หรือไม่ใครสมควรได้รับการลงโทษทางเศรษฐกิจหรือเชื้อชาติเดียวกัน ไม่ว่ากลุ่มจะหลีกเลี่ยงการเป็นคนวงนอก ถ้าพวกเขามี ความผิด ถ้าประหารนักโทษก็จะลดลงหรือการลงโทษของพวกเขาจะไม่สมควรได้รับ การวางประเด็นโร่ถ้าโทษประหารถูกบังคับผิดดำ ไม่ขาว ผิด หรือ ถ้ามันถูกกำหนดโดยการจับสลากของคนผิด การเลือกปฏิบัติหรือการเอาแต่ใจไร้เหตุผลนี้จะไม่ให้โทษที่ไม่เป็นธรรม หรือทำให้ใครต้องถูกลงโทษอย่างไม่เป็นธรรม แม้โทษให้แก่ผู้อื่น ( เกินควร 6 )ความเสมอภาค ในสั้น ดูเหมือน ศีลธรรมที่สำคัญน้อยกว่าความยุติธรรม และความยุติธรรมเป็นอิสระของการแจกแจงอสมการ อุดมคติของความต้องการความยุติธรรมเท่าเทียมว่า ความยุติธรรมจะเท่า ๆ กันกระจาย ไม่ได้บอกว่ามันถูกแทนที่โดยเสมอภาค ความยุติธรรมต้องเป็นจำนวนมากของความผิดที่เป็นไปได้ถูกลงโทษ ไม่ว่าคนอื่นจะหลีกเลี่ยงการลงโทษให้ผู้อื่นนี้หนีสมควรได้รับการลงโทษ ไม่ได้ทำเพื่อความยุติธรรม หรือเพื่อสังคม แต่มันไม่ยุติธรรมกับผู้ที่ไม่อาจหลบหนี การพิจารณาจริยธรรมเหล่านี้จะหมายถึงการปฏิเสธที่ไร้เหตุผล เลือกปฏิบัติ หรือความไม่แน่นอน จะสอดคล้องกับความต้องการตามรัฐธรรมนูญแต่ผมพอใจที่ศาลฎีกาได้ในความเป็นจริงให้ยึดมั่นในความต้องการของรัฐธรรมนูญความเท่าเทียมกันมากที่สุดเท่าที่เป็นไปได้ บางภาพก็ย่อมเป็นเรื่องจริงในระบบใด ๆ ( 7 ) แต่ทำไม Ultra Posse นีโม obligatur . รึเปล่า ( ไม่มีใครผูกพันเกินความสามารถ ) ( 8 )ข้อมูลล่าสุดเปิดเผยการแบ่งแยกเชื้อชาติในการพิจารณาน้อยโดยตรงของผู้ถูกจับข้อหาฆาตกรรม ( 9 ) การยกเลิกการลงโทษประหารชีวิตสำหรับการข่มขืนได้กำจัดแหล่งที่มาของการเลือกปฏิบัติทางเชื้อชาติ concededly บางจำแนกตามเชื้อชาติของเหยื่อฆาตกรรมอาจมีอยู่ แต่การเลือกปฏิบัตินี้มีผลต่อคดีอาญา victimizers ฆาตกรรมในวิธีที่ไม่คาดคิดฆาตกรของไข่ขาวคิดว่าน่าจะถูกกว่าของฆาตกรที่ฆ่าคนผิวดํา สีดำเหยื่อ จากนั้นจะน้อยกว่าอย่างแก้แค้นมากกว่าคนขาว อย่างไรก็ตาม เพราะฆาตกรฆ่าคนผิวดำดำที่สุด ฆาตกรสีดำงดเว้นโทษประหารชีวิตบ่อยกว่า เป็นฆาตกรสีขาว พวกเขาเดินทางกว่าฆาตกรสีขาวมากที่สุด ( 10 )แรงจูงใจที่อยู่เบื้องหลังการกระจายไม่เท่ากันของโทษประหารอาจดีได้รับการต่อต้านคนผิวดำ แต่ผลที่ชื่นชอบพวกเขา การแบ่งปันที่ไม่เหมาะสมหรือไม่เพียงพอจึงเป็นฟาง คนเชิงประจักษ์ ตลอดจนวิเคราะห์ reasons.ii .การสำรวจล่าสุดของ justicein miscarriages อาจารย์อดัม bedau ฮิวโก้และไมเคิลเรดเล็ท พบว่า 7 , 000 คนถูกประหารชีวิตในสหรัฐอเมริการะหว่าง 1900 และ 1985 และ 35 มีความผิดในอาชญากรรมทุน ( 11 ) ท่ามกลางความไร้เดียงสาพวกเขารายการและโค vanzetti รวมทั้งเธล และจูเลียส โรเซนเบอร์ก แม้ว่าข้อมูลของพวกเขาอาจจะน่าสงสัย ผมไม่สงสัยเลยว่า ระยะเวลานานพอmiscarriages แห่งความยุติธรรมจะเกิดขึ้นได้แม้ในกรณีทุน แม้จะมีมาตรการป้องกัน เกือบทุกกิจกรรมของมนุษย์ เช่น รถบรรทุก แสงสว่าง หรือก่อสร้าง ต้นทุนชีวิตของผู้บริสุทธิ์ผู้เห็นเหตุการณ์ เราไม่ได้ให้กิจกรรมเหล่านี้ เพราะข้อดี ศีลธรรม หรือวัสดุ outweigh การสูญเสียไม่ตั้งใจ ( 12 ) analogously สำหรับคนที่คิดว่าโทษประหารแค่miscarriages ความยุติธรรมถูกชดเชยโดยผลประโยชน์ทางศีลธรรมและประโยชน์ของความยุติธรรม สำหรับผู้ที่คิดว่าโทษประหารชีวิตธรรมแม้เมื่อมันไม่ได้แท้ง miscarriages , แทบจะไม่สามารถ decisive.iii . deterrencedespite มากผลงานล่าสุด ก็ยังไม่มีข้อสรุปสถิติสาธิตว่าโทษประหารเป็นโทษมากกว่าเป็นทางเลือกที่ดีในการป้องปราม ( 13 ) อย่างไรก็ตามเสียน้อยกว่าเด็ดขาดเช่นกัน ที่พักพิงส่วนใหญ่ยอมรับว่าพวกเขาจะสนับสนุนต่อไป ถ้ายกเลิกโทษประหารถูกแสดงเพื่อยับยั้งฆาตกรรมมากกว่าทางเลือกที่สามารถยับยั้ง ( 14 ) ที่พักพิงปรากฏคุณค่าชีวิตของฆาตกร หรือ อย่างน้อย เขาไม่โดนประหารสูงมากขึ้นกว่าที่พวกเขาค่าชีวิตของเหยื่อผู้บริสุทธิ์ที่อาจได้รับการยกเว้นโดย deterring ฆาตกรในอนาคต การป้องปรามไม่ได้ทั้งหมดที่เด็ดขาดสำหรับฉันเหมือนกัน ผมจะชอบความคงทนของโทษประหารเป็นวิบากกรรม แม้จะพบว่าภัยคุกคามของการดำเนินการไม่สามารถยับยั้งฆาตกรในอนาคตไม่ได้ deterred โดยภัยคุกคามของการจำคุก ( 15 ) ยังคงผมเชื่อว่า การลงโทษประหารชีวิตเพราะมีวาระสุดท้าย คือกลัวมากขึ้นกว่าจำคุกและซื้อบางอย่างในอนาคต ฆาตกรไม่ deterred โดยความคิดของการจำคุก ประหยัดชีวิตแม้แต่น้อย เหยื่อของฆาตกรโดย deterring อนาคตสำคัญกว่าการรักษาชีวิตของนักโทษ ฆาตกร เพราะ O ความเป็นไปได้หรือความน่าจะเป็นtht รันพวกเขาจะไม่เป็นอุปสรรคอื่น ๆ ในขณะที่ชีวิตของเหยื่อที่อาจได้รับการบันทึกที่มีคุณค่า ที่ฆาตกรได้ลบค่า เพราะความผิดของเขา ย่อมกฎหมายอาญา หมายถึง การปกป้องชีวิตของเหยื่อที่มีศักยภาพในการตั้งค่าของฆาตกรที่แท้จริง อัตราฆาตกรรมจะถูกกำหนดโดยปัจจัยหลายอย่างทั้งความรุนแรงและความเป็นไปได้ของขู่ลงโทษอยู่เสมออย่างแน่นอน อย่างไรก็ตาม สำหรับยาว ผมใช้มุมมองของเซอร์เจมส์ฟิตส์เจมส์สตีเฟน : " ผู้ชายบางคน อาจจะ ละเว้นจากการฆ่า เพราะพวกเขากลัวว่าถ้าพวกเขาถูกฆาตกรรมจะถูกแขวนคอ หลายร้อย หลายพัน งดเพราะเรื่องมันกับหนังสยองขวัญหนึ่งเหตุผลที่ดีว่าทำไมพวกเขาเกี่ยวข้องกับความน่ากลัวที่ฆาตกรจะแขวนคอ ( 16 ) " เกี่ยวกับการเป็นประโยชน์ในระยะยาวสำหรับการก่อตัวของพันธนาการภายใน ดังนั้นต้องควบคุมอาชญากรรม ความรุนแรงและวาระสุดท้ายของโทษประหารเหมาะสมที่จะจริงจังและออกมาฆ่า ( 17 ) . ปัญหาที่เกิดค่าใช้จ่าย relativesuffering IV ,ปัญหา nondecisive brutalizationmany เกี่ยวข้องกับโทษประหารชีวิต บางคนเชื่อว่าต้นทุนทางการเงินของดูดทุนประโยคมากเกินไป ( 18 ) แต่ส่วนใหญ่จากการเปรียบเทียบต้นทุนกับต้นทุนของชีวิต จำคุกตลอดชีวิต ด้วยต้นทุนของการดำเนินการ นอกเหนือจากความเกี่ยวข้องที่น่าสงสัยของพวกเขามีข้อบกพร่องอย่างน้อยโดยโดยนัย สมมติว่านักโทษจะสร้างต้นทุนชีวิตไม่มีตุลาการในเรือนจำของพวกเขา ในอัตราใด จริง การเงิน ต้นทุน trumped จากความสำคัญของการทำยุติธรรม คนอื่นดันที่คนตัดสินประหารชีวิตทนทุกข์ทรมานมากกว่าเหยื่อที่เขาได้รับความเดือดร้อน และที่นี่ ( ส่วนเกิน ) คือความทุกข์ที่ไม่เหมาะสมตามไปรึเปล่า เล็กซ์ talionis รึเปล่า ( กฎของการแก้แค้น ) ( 19 )เราไม่สามารถรู้ได้ว่า ฆาตกรนักโทษประหารทนทุกข์ทรมานมากกว่าเหยื่อที่เขาได้รับความเดือดร้อน อย่างไรก็ตาม แตกต่างจากฆาตกร เหยื่อสมควรไม่มีความทุกข์สร้างความเจ็บปวด เพิ่มเติม ข้อ จำกัด ของไหม เล็กซ์ talionis รึเปล่า ตั้งใจที่จะยับยั้งความแค้นส่วนตัว ไม่สังคม ผลกรรมที่เกิดขึ้นของ การลงโทษ -- โดยไม่คำนึงถึงแรงจูงใจ -- ไม่ได้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อแก้แค้น , ชดเชยหรือชดเชยความเจ็บปวดของเหยื่อ หรือจะวัดโดย การลงโทษเพื่อแก้แค้น กฎหมายและการจัดระเบียบสังคม ทำลายโดยการก่ออาชญากรรม ทำไมลักพาตัวข้อจำกัดคือไม่ จำกัด ระยะเวลาที่เขาขังเหยื่อ หรือเป็นโจรออกมาหมายถึงเพียงการชดเชยความทุกข์ทรมานหรือทำร้ายเขา ทำให้เหยื่อของเขาหรือจะหมายถึงเพียงการชดเชยประโยชน์ที่เขาได้รับ ( 20 ) อื่นอาร์กิวเมนต์ได้ยินอย่างน้อยตั้งแต่ร ์เบ็คคาเรีย ( 21 ) คือ การฆ่า ฆาตกร เราส่งเสริม สนับสนุน หรือถูกต้องตามกฎหมายชอบด้วยกฎหมายฆ่า แต่จะโทษก็ขัดหูขัดตา มันไม่ค่อยโต้เถียงที่พวกเขาถูกต้องตามกฎหมายกำหนดอันมิชอบด้วยกฎหมาย เหมือนได้สบายๆจำคุกไม่คิดที่จะถูกต้องตามกฎหมายการลักพาตัว หรือจะปรับแม้ว่า

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การสนับสนุนเครื่องมือแปลภาษา: กรีก, กันนาดา, กาลิเชียน, คลิงออน, คอร์สิกา, คาซัค, คาตาลัน, คินยารวันดา, คีร์กิซ, คุชราต, จอร์เจีย, จีน, จีนดั้งเดิม, ชวา, ชิเชวา, ซามัว, ซีบัวโน, ซุนดา, ซูลู, ญี่ปุ่น, ดัตช์, ตรวจหาภาษา, ตุรกี, ทมิฬ, ทาจิก, ทาทาร์, นอร์เวย์, บอสเนีย, บัลแกเรีย, บาสก์, ปัญจาป, ฝรั่งเศส, พาชตู, ฟริเชียน, ฟินแลนด์, ฟิลิปปินส์, ภาษาอินโดนีเซี, มองโกเลีย, มัลทีส, มาซีโดเนีย, มาราฐี, มาลากาซี, มาลายาลัม, มาเลย์, ม้ง, ยิดดิช, ยูเครน, รัสเซีย, ละติน, ลักเซมเบิร์ก, ลัตเวีย, ลาว, ลิทัวเนีย, สวาฮิลี, สวีเดน, สิงหล, สินธี, สเปน, สโลวัก, สโลวีเนีย, อังกฤษ, อัมฮาริก, อาร์เซอร์ไบจัน, อาร์เมเนีย, อาหรับ, อิกโบ, อิตาลี, อุยกูร์, อุสเบกิสถาน, อูรดู, ฮังการี, ฮัวซา, ฮาวาย, ฮินดี, ฮีบรู, เกลิกสกอต, เกาหลี, เขมร, เคิร์ด, เช็ก, เซอร์เบียน, เซโซโท, เดนมาร์ก, เตลูกู, เติร์กเมน, เนปาล, เบงกอล, เบลารุส, เปอร์เซีย, เมารี, เมียนมา (พม่า), เยอรมัน, เวลส์, เวียดนาม, เอสเปอแรนโต, เอสโทเนีย, เฮติครีโอล, แอฟริกา, แอลเบเนีย, โคซา, โครเอเชีย, โชนา, โซมาลี, โปรตุเกส, โปแลนด์, โยรูบา, โรมาเนีย, โอเดีย (โอริยา), ไทย, ไอซ์แลนด์, ไอร์แลนด์, การแปลภาษา.