Much of the international relations literature concerned with prospects for international monetary reform can be read as a search for an alternative to hegemony as a basis for international monetary stability. Great play is givento the contrast between earlier periods of hegemonic dominance, notably 1890–1914 and 1945–1971, and the nature of the task presently confronting aspiringarchitects of international monetary institutions in an increasingly multipolarworld. In this paper I suggest that hegemonic stability theories are helpful forunderstanding the relatively smooth operation of the classical gold standardand the early Bretton Woods system, as well as some of the difficulties of theinterwar years. At the same time, much of the evidence is difficult to reconcilewith the hegemonic stability view. Even when individual countries occupiedpositions of exceptional prominence in the world economy and that prominencewas reflected in the form and functioning of the international monetary system,that system was still fundamentally predicated on international collaboration.Keohane’s notion of “hegemonic cooperation”—that cooperation is requiredfor systemic stability even in periods of hegemonic dominance, although thepresence of a hegemon may encourage cooperative behavior—seems directlyapplicable to international monetary relations. The importance of collaborationis equally apparent in the design of the international monetary system, itsoperation under normal circumstances, and the management of crises. Despitethe usefulness of hegemonic stability theory when applied to short periodsand well-defined aspects of international monetary relations, the internationalmonetary system has always been “after hegemony” in the sense that morethan a dominant economic power was required to ensure the provision and