There is an interesting debate concerning whether the
same is true of dignity and of respect for persons. One
view is that any action at all could be consistent with
these principles provided that a sufficiently robust valid
consent had been obtained from the people affected.
An alternative view is that some types of action are an
affront to human dignity even if they are fully consensual:
‘dwarf tossing’ and ‘sex work’ are amongst the contested
cases. (6
) Consider, for example, the famous
French case of Manuel Wackenheim. Wackenheim was
a (so-called) dwarf who (until a ban was imposed,
partly on the grounds that his job was contrary to
human dignity) made a living from being ‘tossed’ by
customers in bars and nightclubs. This ‘tossing’ formed
part of a dwarf throwing competition – a sport “in
which the aim of the competitors is to fling a dwarf
over the furthest distance possible”. (7
) Wackenheim
appeared keen to pursue his chosen career and did
not welcome the ban on dwarf throwing, saying “this
spectacle is my life; I want to be allowed to do what
I want”. So the question that this raises is: assuming that
his consent to be ‘tossed’ is free and informed, ought we
nonetheless to view the act of ‘dwarf tossing’ as inconsistent
with human dignity? We should also bear in
mind, though, that dignity is not the only possible moralconsideration in such cases (or indeed in research ethics)
and that ‘dwarf tossing’ could be objectionable on
grounds other than dignity. For example, it may be too
dangerous, or it may incite other people to ‘toss’ short
people against their wills