our view, to serious problems of abuse and even inhumanity.
Not only does HRM in management seem dominated by a
one-dimensional conception of human beings (often the economically
conceived rational being), but it is also unhistorical,
non-critical, and geared to a privileged minority. If HRM
in IR appears more critical and more historically justified,
recent trends seem to demonstrate the same failings as those
found in HRM stemming from management because of the
increasingly accepted premise of the dominant “economism”
with its truncated vision of the “person.” To our knowledge,
there is no HRM university program grounded in the radical
tradition of thought in management or IR schools.
A first observation that stems from those preceding comments
is that North American HRM, mainly centered on
practitioners, corresponds to the alignment of HRM practices
with strategic management and to its contribution toward the
profitability and use of the “best practices” in the industry as
a means of achieving those ends. Critical HRM, as is well
known, is European and more present in IR. Its supporters
challenge the unitary vision of their colleagues on the other
side of the Atlantic, denouncing the authoritarian and manipulative
character of an HRM designed only for the sole benefit
of management and shareholders. Greenwood (2002)
goes even further, claiming that ethics is almost absent from
current practices in modern HRM. Based on the works of
Legge (1996), she explains the existence of two very clear
tendencies among businesses: “hard” HRM, where human
beings are simply factors of production obtainable at the
lowest possible cost and disposable after usage; and “soft”
HRM, where the same results can be achieved in a more
subtle way through manipulation. Until very recently, few
treaties had been making ethics their central theme in the
general field of management and in the more specific branch
of managing human beings. Winstanley and Woodall (2000a,
2000b), Deckop (2006), Gilliland, Steiner, and Skarlicki
(2007), as well as Pinnington, Macklin, and Campbell
(2007), have all published collective works dealing explicitly
with moral issues raised by HRM practices and by management,
but a clear model challenging HRM has not emerged
from their efforts, nor has a coherent ethical stance.
Hence,3
to achieve a new model, a first step would be to
question HRM’s very name (Inkson, 2008, has aptly ask this
question), for “[t]here are implicit assumptions inherent in
the conception underlying the expression human resource
management” (Dachler & Enderle, 1989, p. 598). We believe
that the passage from personnel management to the conceptualization
of human beings as “resources” has paved the
way for renewed exploitation and abuse. The objectification
of the human being is most certainly possible, but it does not
mean that human beings should be treated mainly as objects.
Over the past few decades, several authors have also
expressed the wish to see HRM profoundly transformed
according to ethical criteria, even if there is no real consensus
on those ethical criteria (Greenwood, 2002; Legge, 2005;
Melé, 2008; Payne & Wayland, 1999; Pirson & Lawrence,
2010; Shultz & Brender-Ilan, 2004; Sloan & Gavin, 2010;
Winstanley & Woodall, 2000a, 2000b). From our point of
view, this has not resulted in a transformation of theorizing
or practices in HRM. To achieve those goals, we propose
switching from HRM to person management.
In defining person management, one must clarify what a
person is and how a person differs from a resource. This is not
a trivial difference because human beings viewed as resources
do not hold the same status and, above all, are not treated in the
same manner. Thus, we will compare what constitutes a person
with its counterpart in the resource tradition. Table 1
shows the elements and the structure of our proposition, which
must be understood as ideal types in the Weberian sense.
our view, to serious problems of abuse and even inhumanity.Not only does HRM in management seem dominated by aone-dimensional conception of human beings (often the economicallyconceived rational being), but it is also unhistorical,non-critical, and geared to a privileged minority. If HRMin IR appears more critical and more historically justified,recent trends seem to demonstrate the same failings as thosefound in HRM stemming from management because of theincreasingly accepted premise of the dominant “economism”with its truncated vision of the “person.” To our knowledge,there is no HRM university program grounded in the radicaltradition of thought in management or IR schools.A first observation that stems from those preceding commentsis that North American HRM, mainly centered onpractitioners, corresponds to the alignment of HRM practiceswith strategic management and to its contribution toward theprofitability and use of the “best practices” in the industry asa means of achieving those ends. Critical HRM, as is wellknown, is European and more present in IR. Its supporterschallenge the unitary vision of their colleagues on the otherside of the Atlantic, denouncing the authoritarian and manipulativecharacter of an HRM designed only for the sole benefitof management and shareholders. Greenwood (2002)goes even further, claiming that ethics is almost absent fromcurrent practices in modern HRM. Based on the works ofLegge (1996), she explains the existence of two very cleartendencies among businesses: “hard” HRM, where humanbeings are simply factors of production obtainable at thelowest possible cost and disposable after usage; and “soft”HRM, where the same results can be achieved in a moresubtle way through manipulation. Until very recently, fewtreaties had been making ethics their central theme in thegeneral field of management and in the more specific branchof managing human beings. Winstanley and Woodall (2000a,2000b), Deckop (2006), Gilliland, Steiner, and Skarlicki(2007), as well as Pinnington, Macklin, and Campbell(2007), have all published collective works dealing explicitlywith moral issues raised by HRM practices and by management,but a clear model challenging HRM has not emergedfrom their efforts, nor has a coherent ethical stance.Hence,3 to achieve a new model, a first step would be toquestion HRM’s very name (Inkson, 2008, has aptly ask thisquestion), for “[t]here are implicit assumptions inherent inthe conception underlying the expression human resourcemanagement” (Dachler & Enderle, 1989, p. 598). We believethat the passage from personnel management to the conceptualizationof human beings as “resources” has paved theway for renewed exploitation and abuse. The objectificationof the human being is most certainly possible, but it does notmean that human beings should be treated mainly as objects.ทศวรรษผ่านมาไม่กี่ หลายผู้เขียนยังได้แสดงอยากดูซึ้งแปลง HRMตามเกณฑ์จริยธรรม ถ้ามีมติไม่จริงเกณฑ์จริยธรรมเหล่านั้น (Greenwood, 2002 Legge, 2005Melé, 2008 Payne & Wayland, 1999 Pirson และลอว์เรนซ์2010 Shultz & Brender-ลานได้รับ 2004 สโลนและเกวิน 2010Winstanley & Woodall, 2000a, 2000b) จากจุดของเราดู มีไม่ส่งผลให้การเปลี่ยนแปลงของเก่าหรือปฏิบัติใน HRM เพื่อให้บรรลุเป้าหมายเหล่านั้น เราสลับจาก HRM การจัดการบุคคลในการกำหนดผู้จัดการ หนึ่งต้องชี้แจงสิ่งบุคคล และวิธีที่ทำให้บุคคลแตกต่างจากทรัพยากร นี้ไม่ได้เล็กน้อยความแตกต่างเนื่องจากมองว่ามนุษย์เป็นทรัพยากรไม่สถานะเดียวกัน ค้างไว้ เหนือสิ่งอื่นใด จะไม่ถือว่าในการลักษณะเดียวกัน ดังนั้น เราจะเปรียบเทียบสิ่งที่ก่อตัวมีของกันในประเพณีทรัพยากร ตารางที่ 1แสดงองค์ประกอบและโครงสร้างของข้อเสนอของเรา ซึ่งต้องเข้าใจว่าเป็นชนิดเหมาะในแง่ Weberian
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
