The revival of a German threat by 1933 placed further strains upon Anglo-French-American diplomatic cooperation at a time when the World Economic Conference had broken down and the three democracies were erecting their own currency and trading blocs. Although France was the more directly threatened by Germany, it was Britain which felt that its freedom of maneuver had been more substantially impinged upon. By 1934 both the Cabinet and its Defence Requirements Committee conceded that while Japan was the more immediate danger, Germany was the greater long-term threat. But since it was not possible to be strong against both it was important to achieve a reconciliation in one of those regions. Whereas circles favored improv. ing relations with Japan so as to be better able to stand up to Germany, the Foreign Office argued that an Anglo-Japanese understanding in the Far East would ruin London's delicate relations with the United States. On the other hand, it could be pointed out to those imperial and naval circles who wanted to give priority to strengthening British defenses in the orient that it was impossible to turn one's back upon French concern over German revisionism and(after 1 fatal to ignore the growing threat from the Luftwaffe. For the rest of the decade the decision-makers in whitehall sought to escape from this dilemma of facing potential enemies at opposite ends of the globe."'