THE SETTLEMENT that followed the Second World War was both the most
fragmented and most far-reaching of any postwar settlement in history.
This was the first major war in history that did not end with a single comprehensive
peace settlement. Peace treaties were not concluded with the
major axis powers, Japan and Germany. The Charter of the United Nations,
unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, was not attached to
the peace settlement.1 And yet, in the years between 1944 and 1951, the
United States and its allies brought about history’s most sweeping reorganization
of international order.
World War II actually culminated in two major settlements. One was
between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies,
and it took the form of Cold War bipolarity. The other was among the
Western industrial countries and Japan, which resulted in a dense set of
new security, economic, and political institutions, almost all involving the
United States. The two settlements were interrelated. The ColdWar reinforced
cohesion among the advanced industrial democracies, and the
breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union beginning in 1947 (and intensifying
after 1950) was critical in shaping the character and extent of the
American security commitment to Europe. Marshall Plan aid and alliance
guarantees, undertaken by the United States to stabilize and reassure postwar
Europe, were made politically acceptable because of the growing fears
of Soviet communism. But although the Cold War reinforced Western
order, the two settlements nonetheless had distinct origins and logics. One
was the most militarized settlement in history, and the other was the most
institutionalized.