This stody examines the association between audit committee characteristics and the ratio
of nonaudit service (NAS) fees to audit fees, using data gathered under the Secuiities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC's) fee disclosure rules. Issues related to NAS fees have been
of concern to practitioners, regulators, and academics for a number of years. Prior research
suggests that audit committees possessing certain characteristics are important participants
in the process of managing the client—auditor relationship. We hypothesize that audit committees
that are independent and active financial monitors have incentives to limit NAS fees
(relative to audit fees) paid to incumbent auditors, in an effort to enhance auditor independence
in either appearance or fact. Our analysis using a sample of 538 flrms indicates that
audit committees comprised solely of independent directors meeting at least four times
amiually are significantly and negatively associated with the NAS fee ratio. This evidence is
consistent with audit committee members perceiving a high level of NAS fees in a negative
light and taking actions to decrease the NAS fee ratio