Concerning the second aspect of svabhāva, which entailed existence as an irreducible, simple substance, it is likely that Nāgārjuna rejected the existence of these,
based upon a well-known Yogācāra argument against the existence of indivisible atoms
(Westerhoff 2009, 37).
Briefly, the argument states that if a compound phenomenon, such as our tree, is made up of atoms, then those atoms must be placed next to one another to make up the branches, leaves, and so forth. Even if one atom does not actually touch any
others, it needs to be surrounded by other atoms in all directions to make up a threedimensional object.
This implies that each atom must have a left side and a right side, as well as a bottom and a top, and a front and a back. Therefore, atoms are not irreducible after all, but can be divided, conceptually at least, into parts. Otherwise, if we state that atoms are 'point-like‘ and indivisible, then our compound phenomena would collapse into a one-dimensional entity (cf. Hopkins 1996, 373).
If we take svabhāva to be an individual underlying its properties (the second aspect of svabhāva) or else, an essential property characterizing the individual (the third
aspect) we find that neither can be thought of as existing independently from the other.
An atom of the tree‘s bark (((Nāgārjuna‘s argument is about space, which as the fifth element, stands for all the others too.)))does not exist without its properties, such as, being brown or being hard; it is impossible even to conceive of something existing without any properties whatsoever.
Neither can properties exist without being instantiated in something (MMK 5; 1–3); there is no 'hardness‘ or 'brownness,‘ without things that are hard and brown. In
Garfield‘s words, "[T]o think of individuals and properties as existing independently and then somehow coming together to constitute particulars makes no sense"(1995, 150).
Therefore, svabhāva cannot be a substance underlying its properties, for there are no
property-less things.