Introduction
Despite dramatic reductions over the years in the noise produced by individual aircraft, airport
noise remains a critical public policy issue today. Moreover, given the expected increases
in airline traffic and airport operations over the next decades, the noise issue will continue to
be a source of dissension. The nature of the problem is evident in the ongoing controversy
surrounding the planned expansion and reorientation of Chicago’s O’Hare airport. While the
expansion requires demolition of several hundred properties, it also reorients the airport’s flight
paths, so that a new set of households will be exposed to noise (see McMillen (2004)). Both of
these anticipated effects have led to vociferous opposition to the expansion from nearby residents,
who have attempted to block the plan in court, despite its recent approval by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Similarly, in Orange County, California, concerns about noise
exposure blocked the construction of a new international airport on a decommissioned military
airbase, even with a shortage of airport capacity in the region (Kranser (2002)). At nearby
John Wayne Airport, departing flights must practice a steep, high-power climb maneuver to
quickly gain altitude before passing over the high-income community of Newport Beach, and
noise concerns in that community continue to limit daily flight volume at the airport.1
The dramatic gains in aircraft “quietness” over the jet age, which have ironically accompanied
ongoing noise concerns, are illustrated by comparing noise from a recent-vintage Boeing
737-700 and a 1967-vintage 727-200. The newer aircraft produces only one-third as much perceived
takeoff noise as its predecessor, despite similar passenger capacities. Because of such
gains in quietness, the number of U.S. residents exposed to significant aircraft noise fell by a
factor of 16 between 1975 and 2000 despite a more than three-fold increase in airline traffic
over the period. However, even with such gains in noise abatement, Figure 1 shows sharply
1
growing trends in various airport noise limits, such as operational curfews, noise quotas, and
noise surcharges, in the U.S. Such measures are even more widespread in Europe, as discussed
by Girvin (2000c).
Noise restrictions are likely to have important impacts on airline service quality and airfares.
Service quality may fall as various operational limits restrict flight frequency, and the expense
of making aircraft quieter, which raises their purchase price and operating cost, may be passed
on in higher airfares. Despite these possible linkages, the airline economics literature contains
no comprehensive analysis of the effect of noise regulation on airline service quality and fares.2
Because of this absence, no proper analysis of optimal noise regulations, which maximize social
welfare taking into account impacts on airlines and their passengers as well as noise victims,
has been possible. The purpose of this paper is to provide the missing analysis through the
use of a highly stylized, but suggestive, theoretical model.
The analysis draws on the scheduling model of Brueckner (2004), where higher flight
frequency benefits passengers by reducing “schedule delay” (allowing departures at moreconvenient
times) while generating higher total noise. Noise per aircraft, denoted n, can
be reduced at a cost, which rises with aircraft size given that quieting a larger plane is more
expensive. The airline is viewed as choosing both n and aircraft size, along with flight frequency
and fares, to maximize profit subject to noise regulations. The manufacturer responds
to the resulting demand for aircraft quietness in its design decisions.
The analysis considers two different regulatory regimes involving explicit noise constraints,
along with an alternative regime where airlines pay noise taxes. The first type of noise constraint
imposes a direct limit on noise per aircraft, with the constraint written as n ≤ n, where
n is the limit. Note that, under this constraint, n is removed as a choice variable for the airline.
The n limit is analogous to the FAA noise certification standard, which governs quietness levels
for new aircraft while also requiring retrofitting of older, noisier planes.3
The second type of constraint is a cumulative noise limit at an airport, which is written
nf ≤ L, where f is flight frequency (the number of flights) and L is total allowed noise for
each airline. Note that an airline has flexibility in meeting a cumulative limit because total
noise depends on both n and flight frequency. This type of constraint, among other noise
แนะนำแม้จะลดละครปีในเสียงที่ผลิต โดยแต่ละเครื่องบิน สนามบินเสียงยังคง เป็นปัญหานโยบายสาธารณะสำคัญวันนี้ นอกจากนี้ ให้เพิ่มขึ้นคาดในสายการบินสนามบินและการจราจรการดำเนินงานทศวรรษถัดไป ปัญหาเสียงยังคงแหล่งที่มาของความไม่เห็นด้วยได้ ปัญหาคือในการถกเถียงอย่างต่อเนื่องรอบแผนขยายและ reorientation สนามบินของชิคาโกโอแฮร์ ในขณะขยายตัวต้องการรื้อถอนหลายร้อยคุณสมบัติ ยัง reorients บินของสนามบินเส้นทาง เพื่อให้ครัวเรือนชุดใหม่ที่จะสัมผัสกับเสียง (ดู McMillen (2004)) ทั้งสองอย่างลักษณะพิเศษเหล่านี้คาดว่าจะได้นำไป vociferous ต่อต้านการขยายตัวจากผู้อยู่อาศัยในบริเวณใกล้เคียงที่ได้พยายามบล็อกแผนในคอร์ท แม้มีการอนุมัติล่าสุดโดยรัฐบาลกลางบริหารการบิน (ฟ้า) ในทำนองเดียวกัน ในออเรนจ์ แคลิฟอร์เนีย กังวลเกี่ยวกับเสียงรบกวนการก่อสร้างสนามใหม่ในทหาร decommissioned บล็อกแสงนะ แม้จะ มีความขาดแคลนของสนามบินในภูมิภาค (Kranser (2002)) ใกล้เคียงสนามบินจอห์น Wayne เที่ยวบินขาออกต้องฝึกวิธีการปีนที่สูงชัน กำลังแรงสูงเพื่อได้ระดับความสูงอย่างรวดเร็วก่อนที่จะผ่านชุมชนรายได้ของนิวพอร์ตบีช และเกี่ยวข้องกับเสียงในที่ชุมชนยังคงจำกัดปริมาณเที่ยวบินที่ airport.1 ในทุกวันThe dramatic gains in aircraft “quietness” over the jet age, which have ironically accompaniedongoing noise concerns, are illustrated by comparing noise from a recent-vintage Boeing737-700 and a 1967-vintage 727-200. The newer aircraft produces only one-third as much perceivedtakeoff noise as its predecessor, despite similar passenger capacities. Because of suchgains in quietness, the number of U.S. residents exposed to significant aircraft noise fell by afactor of 16 between 1975 and 2000 despite a more than three-fold increase in airline trafficover the period. However, even with such gains in noise abatement, Figure 1 shows sharply1growing trends in various airport noise limits, such as operational curfews, noise quotas, andnoise surcharges, in the U.S. Such measures are even more widespread in Europe, as discussedby Girvin (2000c).Noise restrictions are likely to have important impacts on airline service quality and airfares.Service quality may fall as various operational limits restrict flight frequency, and the expenseof making aircraft quieter, which raises their purchase price and operating cost, may be passedon in higher airfares. Despite these possible linkages, the airline economics literature containsno comprehensive analysis of the effect of noise regulation on airline service quality and fares.2Because of this absence, no proper analysis of optimal noise regulations, which maximize socialwelfare taking into account impacts on airlines and their passengers as well as noise victims,has been possible. The purpose of this paper is to provide the missing analysis through theuse of a highly stylized, but suggestive, theoretical model.The analysis draws on the scheduling model of Brueckner (2004), where higher flightfrequency benefits passengers by reducing “schedule delay” (allowing departures at moreconvenienttimes) while generating higher total noise. Noise per aircraft, denoted n, canbe reduced at a cost, which rises with aircraft size given that quieting a larger plane is moreexpensive. The airline is viewed as choosing both n and aircraft size, along with flight frequencyand fares, to maximize profit subject to noise regulations. The manufacturer respondsto the resulting demand for aircraft quietness in its design decisions.The analysis considers two different regulatory regimes involving explicit noise constraints,along with an alternative regime where airlines pay noise taxes. The first type of noise constraintimposes a direct limit on noise per aircraft, with the constraint written as n ≤ n, wheren is the limit. Note that, under this constraint, n is removed as a choice variable for the airline.The n limit is analogous to the FAA noise certification standard, which governs quietness levelsfor new aircraft while also requiring retrofitting of older, noisier planes.3The second type of constraint is a cumulative noise limit at an airport, which is writtennf ≤ L, where f is flight frequency (the number of flights) and L is total allowed noise foreach airline. Note that an airline has flexibility in meeting a cumulative limit because totalnoise depends on both n and flight frequency. This type of constraint, among other noise
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..