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Moreover, the stress on "voluntary respect'' and "unanimous views" would appear to reject coercive tactics (e.g. the with-drawal of Soviet technicians from Communist China in 1960 and economic sanctions applied to Albania since that time) as a means of extracting obedience t o Moscow. Corroborative evidence for this conclusion would be provided by North Vietnam's conduct at the Albanian Workers Party Congress in February
1961. Whereas the Russian representative attacked the Albanian party leaders (obliquely of course) as "renegades…foaming
at the mouth in fits of hatred and hostility against our party", tile North Vietnamese delegate praised the Albanian leaders for ' "profound faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism" and "their correct leadership.”
Another manifestation of this principle of "voluntary" allegiance was Le Duan's clear implication that the Lao Dong party would look to both the "Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party" (the "two largest par- ties") for guidance in charting its own revolutionary course. This implication was made first of all by omitting the tribute paid the CPSU in theMoscowDeclaration--"the universally recognized vanguard...whose experience is of fundamental significance"--and by substituting the neutral statement that the
DRV "would study the collective experience of brother countries.'' The principle was also to be evident in North Vietnam's resumption in 1961, after a six months' hiatus following the Bucharest Conference, of laudatory appraisals of Communist China's "leap forward" and commune programs and reassertion of "the great significance of the Chinese revolution to the revolution of Vietnam."
The intent of Hanoi to follow a neutral course in the Sino-Soviet dispute was also demonstrated in Le Duan's discussion of the nature of relations between bloc countries. After referring t o the ''USSR and China" as “the two largest countries bearing heaviest responsibility for maintaining unity within
the socialist camp," the party leader indicated that North Vietnam's policy thereafter would be to "strengthen unity and friend- ship between our country and the USSR and China" and "between our party and the CPSU and the CCP."
As events throughout the remainder of 1961 would demonstrate, it would become increasingly difficult to implement this neutral strategy. The requirements of impartiality were illustrated in somewhat ludicrous fashion by Premier Pham Van Dong in mid-year when he lauded Communist China in Peiping as "the closest friend of the DRV" and then hailed Khrushchev in Moscow as "the closest friend of the Vietnamese people." And Khrushchev's bid at the 22nd Party Congress to establish supremacy over the Communist bloc and world Communist movement would aggravate Sino-Soviet tensions and further complicate Hanoi's effort to maintain a neutral stance.
On balance, however, it is clear that North Vietnam has been a major beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute as the two bloc powers have intensified competition for influence over "national liberation movements" in Southeast Asia. The recipient of vastly augmented economic and military assistance from both Moscow and Peiping during the past two years, the North Vietnamese party leaders have every reason to persist in their chosen role of moderator and neutral in the deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China.