Inherent in the policy of engagement was the tendency to give China the benefit of the doubt in the short term in the hope of significant changes in the longer term. The policy of engagement required continual judgments as to which transgressions by the Chinese could be overlooked or treated softly and on which it was necessary to take a firm stand. In other words, whatever the theory, in practice the policy of engagement always entailed the potential for disagreement. Those who emphasized the benefits of commercial engagement were less exercised by the possibility that exports of high technology might be used by the Chinese military against US interests than those who were more focused on the security aspects of engagement. The more immediate problem was that the policy encountered a roster of different responses from various groups that were influential in Congress. Human-rights groups continued to demand that China be treated more severely for its government’s continuing suppression of dissent, ethnic minorities, independent religious group, trade unionists and so on. Christian fundamentalists were highly critical of China’s policies on the one-child family and especially on abortion. Others saw China as a growing military threat ground of generally unfavourable reporting on China by television, radio and the newspapers, there was a significant gap between the executive and the legislative branches of government on China policy.