The Monetary Policy Committee (Copom), whose members are the Governor and
Deputy Governors, decided to raise the basic short-term interest rate (Selic) from 39 percent p.a.
to 45 percent p.a., taking into account that the future contracts for the next maturity were already
trading at 43.5 percent. An important novelty was introduced, the bias on the interest rates, which
delegated to the Central Bank’s Governor the power to change interest rates during the period
between two ordinary Committee meetings (they used to be 5 weeks, prior to the adoption of the
inflation targeting framework). The Copom established a downward bias, meaning that interest
rates could be lowered at any time before the next scheduled meeting.3
For the first time, also, the Committee released a brief explanation right after the meeting
(the minutes used to be released only after 3 months). Its initial words were “maintaining price
stability is the primary objective of the Central Bank.” And it went on to say that: “(1) in a
floating exchange rate regime, sustained fiscal austerity together with a compatible monetary
austerity support price stability; (2) as fiscal policy is given in the short run, the control over
inflationary pressures should be exerted by the interest rate; (3) observed inflation is due to
the currency depreciation, and markets expect a further rise in the price level this month;
(4) the basic interest rate should be sufficiently high to offset exchange-based inflationary
pressures; and (5) so, we decided to raise the basic interest rate to 45 percent p.a., but with a
downward bias, for if the exchange rate returns to more realistic levels, keeping the nominal
interest rate that high would be unjustified.” Indeed, the bias was used twice before the next
meeting: the interest rate was reduced first to 42 percent and then to 39.5 percent, following a
reversal of the exchange rate overshooting and a reduction both in observed and expected
inflation rates.
The second front was the initiative to propose the adoption of inflation targeting as the
new monetary policy regime. Although it is clear from the Copom’s press release that IT was
already in the minds of the Board’s members, there was a lot of work to do in the institutional
area. For example, the Central Bank has never been granted formal instrument independence to
conduct monetary policy. Moreover, even at the Bank, very few staff members knew what an IT
framework was about. The technical skills needed to develop adequate inflation-forecasting
models were scattered unevenly throughout the Bank’s departments. In particular, there was no
Research Department: each department used to make its own research efforts, usually to solve
immediate demands and not devoted to think coherently about the future.
Once these problems were detected, their solution was straightforward. The new floating
exchange rate clearly required a new nominal anchor for economic policy. Monetary policy,
along with strengthened fiscal adjustment and a firm wage policy in the public sector, would be
instrumental in preventing the recurrence of an inflationary spiral and ensuring a rapid
deceleration of the rate of inflation. Inflation targeting was the most suited framework to achieve
economic stabilization under a flexible exchange rate regime, with the target itself playing the role
of the nominal anchor. With sound arguments, it was not difficult to convince the President, the
3
On the other hand, under a downward bias, if the Governor needs to raise interest rates, an
extraordinary Copom meeting must be called to take the decision.