treatment of a patient and what is intrinsically good is reducing, easing,
and ultimately eliminating suffering for those capable of suffering. Of
course, it might be true that, in extreme cases, the only way to treat suffering
is
by
means
of
euthanasia.
I
cannot
settle
that
difficult
issue
here.
My
point is simply that the Nirodha View has the resources to resist the
Null Bomb Objection precisely because it recognizes that the cessation of
suffering is intrinsically valuable in a relational sense: it is not the unqualified
cessation
of
suffering
that
is
intrinsically
valuable,
but
the
cessation
of suffering in those capable of suffering.
Of course, traditional
Buddhists have another response to this objection since they endorse
karma and rebirth. Destroying the entire world cannot do anything to
eliminate suffering because everyone would simply be reborn in the
round of rebirth according to his or her karmic desert. Even if we don’t
accept the doctrines of karma and rebirth, however, the Nirodha View
has resources that Negative Utilitarianism does not—and for that reason
alone even non-Buddhists should take the view seriously.
8
8
9
For what it’s worth, I think this insight helps explain an unappreciated reason for
which the Buddha himself resists annihilationism, the view that those who achieve parinirvāṇa
are
destroyed
at
the
moment
of
death.
On
the
standard
account,
of
course,
the
Buddha
resisted annihilationism because the view presupposes that there is a substance-self
(an
ātman)
that
is
destroyed
at
the
moment
of
final
liberation.
I
think
that’s
right
as far as it goes, but I also think the Nirodha View allows us to see that there is
more to the story than this. The Buddha also resists annihilationism because it implies
that, in seeking to eradicate suffering and in striving to achieve parinirvāṇa, we work
toward the goal of total extinction, not merely the extinction of the living flames of
suffering or even the fuel that conditions suffering, but the extinction of the very preconditions
of
suffering—the
extinction
of
sentience
itself.
Of course, I would need to do more than I have to develop and defend the Nirodha
View’s relational account of the cessation of suffering’s intrinsic goodness. It might
turn out that the view faces insurmountable philosophical problems. My goal here has
9
been more modest than a full-scale philosophical defense. I have tried to articulate and