exploitation practices in a well-defined area of the Lagoon (Tuyen et al., 2010). These user groups would have an
incentive to prevent members from overstating their production levels (if seed ITQs are grandfathered) as this would
dilute the shares of other members. Second, the cost of monitoring farmer compliance is expected to decline because
members of FAs have an incentive to police the actions of other members, and rule-breakers would find it difficult
to conceal their opportunistic behaviour from neighbours. Third, FA’s would also have a cost advantage over
government agencies in collecting and disseminating information needed to support decentralised quota markets. On
the other hand, government agencies would have cost advantages in assembling technical information about
sustainable production levels in different parts of the Lagoon, establishing quota zones and their aggregate
seed quota, and in resolving conflicts between user groups.
exploitation practices in a well-defined area of the Lagoon (Tuyen et al., 2010). These user groups would have anincentive to prevent members from overstating their production levels (if seed ITQs are grandfathered) as this woulddilute the shares of other members. Second, the cost of monitoring farmer compliance is expected to decline becausemembers of FAs have an incentive to police the actions of other members, and rule-breakers would find it difficultto conceal their opportunistic behaviour from neighbours. Third, FA’s would also have a cost advantage overgovernment agencies in collecting and disseminating information needed to support decentralised quota markets. Onthe other hand, government agencies would have cost advantages in assembling technical information aboutsustainable production levels in different parts of the Lagoon, establishing quota zones and their aggregateseed quota, and in resolving conflicts between user groups.
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