This paper analyses one aspect of the problem of Thailand’s ongoing insurgency, namely the bureaucratic structure in the far south and the role of the bureaucrat as an agent. The discourse on structure emphasizes the need to make the bureaucracy better “integrated” (buranakarn) in order to improve coordination among the key agencies responsible for tackling the conflict. During 2004–09 there were persistent changes to the bureaucratic structure in the far south which hindered the effective implementation of policies. At the same time, the discourse on bureaucrats focused on the need to send “virtuous” individuals to the region, to remove those who had misbehaved, and to offer training and special rewards for those who remained. Increasingly, fewer bureaucrats are willing to work in the troubled provinces which has led public agencies to implement new recruitment strategies. A relatively recent development has been a policy of localization whereby local Malay Muslims are appointed to the bureaucracy so as to create a more representative bureaucracy in the region. This paper provides details of the above issues and discusses the importance of understanding the two levels of analysis of structure and agent.