As noted earlier, it is critical that budgeting and planning are more closely integrated than in the past, and that budgets are directly linked with the implementation of the government’s priority policies and programs. The PFM strategy recognizes the importance of these issues and focuses on aligning revenue targets and expenditure ceilings with the government’s overall plan; better integrating current and capital budgeting, including through the MoFR and MNPED; jointly issuing expenditure ceilings to sector ministries; and providing incentives to ministries to allocate resources more strategically. To effectively implement such changes, it will also be important to move as quickly as possible to develop and utilize a medium-term budget and expenditure framework. The links between national and local planning also need to be strengthened and the system for allocating funds to states and regions needs to be reformed (Nixon et al. 2013).
The PFM strategy recognizes the need to strengthen the budget process itself and focuses, in particular, on improvements to the budget formulation process, reducing the significance of supplementary budgets, and making the financial position of SEEs more transparent. But it is important to emphasize that issues of budget comprehensiveness go beyond issues surrounding the transparency of SEEs and revenues from natural resources.
There are a number of related concerns regarding Myanmar’s budget comprehensiveness, including: (i) nonstandard reporting of some revenues and expenditures, (ii) extra-budgetary government expenditure from separate accounts within the Myanmar Economic Bank, and (iii) potential accounts held outside the Myanmar Economic Bank. In the first category, the budgets published in Myanmar’s official Gazette, which inform this paper’s analysis, include a line for “Other General Revenues.” The sources of revenue for this budget line are not disaggregated. Second, the World Bank’s Public Finance Management Performance Report identifies “Other Accounts” held by ministries and SEEs at branches of the Myanmar Economic Bank, which represent extra-budgetary expenditure and are not fully reported. In FY2011, total extra-budgetary expenditures from over 13,400 such accounts were estimated at 24% of total public expenditures (including SEE expenditures), and the revenues flowing into such accounts were estimated to be 44% of total public sector revenue (including the revenue of SEEs), much of this from the extractive sector (World Bank 2013). Most of these accounts are held by SEEs. But when SEEs (and donor programs) are excluded, spending from “Other Accounts” is still estimated to represent more than 10% of total government expenditures (World Bank 2013). Finally, Myanmar’s Auditor General “has surmised that there may indeed be accounts held outside of the Myanmar Economic Bank and that some revenues generated from joint ventures, as well as from natural resources, could also be extra-budgetary” (World Bank 2013, p.
37). As these holdings are by nature unrecorded, this paper’s analysis of the government’s public financial management necessarily excludes them.
Reform in these areas is needed to support the transformation of future increased revenue intake into better service delivery, which would support poverty reduction and growth. In particular, the revenue, capital, and debts of the Ministry of Defense are not disclosed in the same manner as those of other ministries (Ministry of Finance and Revenue 2013). For military spending to be shifted to more productive sectors, in line with the allocation levels of Myanmar’s neighbors, the actual quantity of spending must be made clear to internal monitoring bodies and the voting public. In addition, grants from donors for projects with ministries, local governments, townships etc. also need to be properly reflected in the budget, especially because international experience has shown that including donor grant spending on-budget can improve allocation decisions and act as a curb on corruption (OECD 2010). Ministries are now required to provide such information to the MoFR but “the grant coverage in the budget is presently incomplete, partly because development partners do not always provide estimates of grant funding” (World Bank 2013, p. 44).
With respect to budget execution, the PFM strategy emphasizes: establishing stronger top- down controls; establishing a realistic first line of control around flows of funds to region and state governments; taking action to minimize use of supplementary budgets and making more timely in-year budgetary adjustments; improving tax administration; and strengthening and aligning cash and debt management to ensure fiscal sustainability and meet government financing needs at the lowest possible cost. Budget execution can also be enhanced by ensuring that the delegation of powers to spending agencies is accompanied by the introduction of clear guidelines with respect to critical dimensions of spending such as procurement and payroll management. Currently, there are no clear guidelines in place, and each spending body is left to develop its own detailed procedures and systems on matters that should be subject to government-wide standards.
Accounting, recording, and reporting is a critical dimension of PFM that may benefit from more attention in the PFM strategy. The strategy recognizes the importance of improving both the timeliness and reporting of in-year financial data using simple technology, although capacity is a concern here as elsewhere. But the focus to date has been mainly on avoiding overspending as opposed to providing information, which can be used for active in-year management and program adjustments. Provision of appropriate, accurate, and timely information is also of critical importance for risk management.
Finally, with respect to auditing and external scrutiny, both the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and parliament are already playing an important role. OAG has purview over all of the public sector, except the Ministry of Defense, and is responsible for setting accounting and auditing policy for the public sector. It has adopted international audit standards, reports to parliament through the president’s office, and is playing an active and constructive role. The Public Accounts and Planning and Finance Committees of parliament have also been active in reviewing and rationalizing budget proposals as well as ensuring that the budget laws are published in the local press.
D. Institutional Restructuring
The government’s PFM reform strategy recognizes that institutional restructuring must accompany reforms in systems, procedures and rules. Institutional restructuring of considerable magnitude will need to take place across ministries and from the top to the bottom of the system. The changes required in the roles and responsibilities of the core institutions responsible for macroeconomic management (the president’s office, the MoFR, and MNPED) are substantial. But equally important are the changes needed within sectoral ministries and at lower levels of government.
A deconcentration of PFM policy functions from the president’s office to the MoFR and MNPED has already taken place. But some further clarification of roles and responsibilities would still be highly beneficial. This includes the role of the MoFR in supporting the Finance Commission and the role of MNPED in supporting the Planning Commission as well as the Foreign Aid Management Central and Working Committees. There are also some critical PFM issues, such as procurement and payroll management, which require macro level guidance and coordination that are not clearly assigned to any institution. In this regard, the creation in February 2013 of the “Public Service Performance Appraisal Task Force (PSPA)” chaired by a minister in the president’s office provides a valuable forum both for reviewing the substance of such issues and determining where responsibility should be placed. The PSPA’s responsibility for cutting red tape could also yield useful results for PFM reform—for example, in tax collection, which has been hampered by an overly complex set of schedules and tariffs which fail to create strong incentives to pay.
The MoFR has already given much thought to the major restructuring that it needs to undergo. Following the separation of the CBM from the MoFR, a new Treasury Department will be established in the MoFR to manage budget execution and reporting. The Budget Department will also be restructured in line with its new responsibilities, including by establishing a fiscal and budget policy unit, a debt management unit (to support a newly established Debt Management Committee), and a unit on inter-governmental fiscal relations, as well as an SEE monitoring function. The Internal Revenue Department is in the process of establishing a Large Taxpayers Office and taking other measures to enable it to effectively implement a new tax policy and administration plan. Other departments in the MoFR may also need to undergo some restructuring. Institutional restructuring within MNPED will also be important. The Planning Department will need to focus much more on policy planning, in addition to investment planning, and to work in a very different way with the planning departments in the sector ministries, as well as with the MoFR to ensure effective coordination between the plan and the budget, as well as between current and capital budgets. It will also need to guide the new bottom-up planning process and work closely with planning a