1. Introduction
China was the first major economy to emerge from the global financial crisis, and it did so in spectacular fashion. After a brief – though sharp – downturn in 2008, the Chinese economy grew by 8.7% in 2009 and by 10.4% in 2010, and the robust growth in China helped a host of resource-rich countries avoid the economic downturn. A big factor behind this enviable success was the massive stimulus programme introduced in the fourth quarter of 2008 and implemented through 2009 and 2010. The initial programme that was announced totalled 4 trillion yuan renminbi (CNY) (USD 586.68 billion), comprising
CNY 1.18 trillion in central government funding plus local government inputs and bank credit. The package amounted to 12.5% of China’s GDP in 2008, to be spent over 27 months.
In relative terms, this was the biggest stimulus package in the world, equal to three times
the size of the United States effort.1
Following Premier Wen Jiabao’s call to make the stimulus “big, fast and effective”, the
programme was implemented with great force and in record time. Along with the huge
fiscal injection, state-owned banks opened their spigots, and total credit grew by more
than one-third in 2009. Local government inputs also far surpassed expectations.
Altogether the total stimulus grew to an estimated 27% of GDP, with an injection of 19%
in 2009 alone.
One obvious inference to draw from this bold stimulus programme and the economy’s
quick recovery is that China has a strong, rich and effective public sector. This was indeed
the one described by George Soros, who said admiringly at a network meeting of his Soros
Foundation-supported Open Society Institute in mid-2010 that “the Chinese government
works better than ours (in the United States)”.
This assessment is incontrovertible if the metric used is solely that of economic
growth and of how quickly China returned to its high growth path; but the performance
through the crisis looks weaker when a broader metric is used. First of all, once unleashed,
the stimulus appeared to spin quickly out of control. Investment in fixed assets jumped to
66% of GDP in 2009, and infrastructure investment leaped to more than 18% of GDP, raising
immediate concerns about the economy’s absorptive capacity and the care with which
projects were selected and implemented.
Indeed, by mid-2009 many policy makers and observers in China had begun to worry
about the nature of the growth brought by the stimulus programme and its by-products.
The big ramp-up in easy credit, for example, helped to fuel an asset bubble that sent prices
of land and housing steeply upward, more than doubling in some big cities during 2009.
The heavy pace of local investment was causing worries about rising local government
debt. By early 2010, the government was sufficiently alarmed to call for an immediate
freeze and audit of local government investment corporations, and by year-end the urgent
problem for macro management had shifted decisively to slowing growth and tamping
down inflationary pressures. At this writing in mid-2011, controlling inflation is now the
top priority task for the government this year.
1. Introduction
China was the first major economy to emerge from the global financial crisis, and it did so in spectacular fashion. After a brief – though sharp – downturn in 2008, the Chinese economy grew by 8.7% in 2009 and by 10.4% in 2010, and the robust growth in China helped a host of resource-rich countries avoid the economic downturn. A big factor behind this enviable success was the massive stimulus programme introduced in the fourth quarter of 2008 and implemented through 2009 and 2010. The initial programme that was announced totalled 4 trillion yuan renminbi (CNY) (USD 586.68 billion), comprising
CNY 1.18 trillion in central government funding plus local government inputs and bank credit. The package amounted to 12.5% of China’s GDP in 2008, to be spent over 27 months.
In relative terms, this was the biggest stimulus package in the world, equal to three times
the size of the United States effort.1
Following Premier Wen Jiabao’s call to make the stimulus “big, fast and effective”, the
programme was implemented with great force and in record time. Along with the huge
fiscal injection, state-owned banks opened their spigots, and total credit grew by more
than one-third in 2009. Local government inputs also far surpassed expectations.
Altogether the total stimulus grew to an estimated 27% of GDP, with an injection of 19%
in 2009 alone.
One obvious inference to draw from this bold stimulus programme and the economy’s
quick recovery is that China has a strong, rich and effective public sector. This was indeed
the one described by George Soros, who said admiringly at a network meeting of his Soros
Foundation-supported Open Society Institute in mid-2010 that “the Chinese government
works better than ours (in the United States)”.
This assessment is incontrovertible if the metric used is solely that of economic
growth and of how quickly China returned to its high growth path; but the performance
through the crisis looks weaker when a broader metric is used. First of all, once unleashed,
the stimulus appeared to spin quickly out of control. Investment in fixed assets jumped to
66% of GDP in 2009, and infrastructure investment leaped to more than 18% of GDP, raising
immediate concerns about the economy’s absorptive capacity and the care with which
projects were selected and implemented.
Indeed, by mid-2009 many policy makers and observers in China had begun to worry
about the nature of the growth brought by the stimulus programme and its by-products.
The big ramp-up in easy credit, for example, helped to fuel an asset bubble that sent prices
of land and housing steeply upward, more than doubling in some big cities during 2009.
The heavy pace of local investment was causing worries about rising local government
debt. By early 2010, the government was sufficiently alarmed to call for an immediate
freeze and audit of local government investment corporations, and by year-end the urgent
problem for macro management had shifted decisively to slowing growth and tamping
down inflationary pressures. At this writing in mid-2011, controlling inflation is now the
top priority task for the government this year.
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