When Edmund Leach (1973) suggested that archaeology
would soon turn from functionalism to structuralism, following
the path of social anthropology, he was clearly unaware
that structuralist archaeology already existed. In particular
the work of Leroi-Gourhan (1965), similar in some respects
to that of Levi-Strauss, had been widely debated. Certainly
structuralism has never dominated the discipline, but its
wide-spread attraction cannot be denied (Anati 1994; Bekaert
1998; Bintliff 1984; Campbell 1998; Collet 1993; Deetz 1983;
Helskog 1995; Hill 1995; Hingley 1990, 1997; Huffman 1981,
1984; Kent 1984; Lenssen-Erz 1994; Leone 1978; Miller 1982a;
Muller 1971; Parker Pearson 1996, 1999; Richard and Thomas
1984; Schnapp 1984; Small 1987; Sørensen 1987; Schmidt
1997; Tilley 1991; Van de Velde 1980; Wright 1995; Yates
1989; Yentsch 1991). These various articles, in addition to
those to be discussed in this chapter, suggest that one can
nowtalk of a structuralist archaeology.
Yet why has the analysis of ‘structured sets of differences’
been so slowto arrive and so slight in impact? Why has structuralism
never formed a major coherent alternative in archaeology?
The first answer to these questions is that structuralism
is not a coherent approach itself, since it covers a great variety
of work, from the structural linguistics of Saussure, and
the generative grammar of Chomsky, to the developmental
psychology of Piaget and the analysis of ‘deep’ meanings by
Levi-Strauss. In archaeology this variety is reflected in the
differences between the formal analyses of Washburn (1983)
and Hillier et al. (1976), the Piagetian accounts of Wynn (1979;
and see Paddaya 1981), and the Levi-Strauss type of analyses
conducted by Leroi-Gourhan (1965; 1982).
When Edmund Leach (1973) suggested that archaeologywould soon turn from functionalism to structuralism, followingthe path of social anthropology, he was clearly unawarethat structuralist archaeology already existed. In particularthe work of Leroi-Gourhan (1965), similar in some respectsto that of Levi-Strauss, had been widely debated. Certainlystructuralism has never dominated the discipline, but itswide-spread attraction cannot be denied (Anati 1994; Bekaert1998; Bintliff 1984; Campbell 1998; Collet 1993; Deetz 1983;Helskog 1995; Hill 1995; Hingley 1990, 1997; Huffman 1981,1984; Kent 1984; Lenssen-Erz 1994; Leone 1978; Miller 1982a;Muller 1971; Parker Pearson 1996, 1999; Richard and Thomas1984; Schnapp 1984; Small 1987; Sørensen 1987; Schmidt1997; Tilley 1991; Van de Velde 1980; Wright 1995; Yates1989; Yentsch 1991). These various articles, in addition tothose to be discussed in this chapter, suggest that one cannowtalk of a structuralist archaeology.Yet why has the analysis of ‘structured sets of differences’been so slowto arrive and so slight in impact? Why has structuralismnever formed a major coherent alternative in archaeology?The first answer to these questions is that structuralismis not a coherent approach itself, since it covers a great varietyof work, from the structural linguistics of Saussure, andthe generative grammar of Chomsky, to the developmentalpsychology of Piaget and the analysis of ‘deep’ meanings byLevi-Strauss. In archaeology this variety is reflected in thedifferences between the formal analyses of Washburn (1983)and Hillier et al. (1976), the Piagetian accounts of Wynn (1979;and see Paddaya 1981), and the Levi-Strauss type of analysesconducted by Leroi-Gourhan (1965; 1982).
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