because it is the best or only way of smoothing out difficulties withth e unknown future (Bates 1988). If we can trust
others then life is easier, social transactions more efficient, and co-operation more likely (Parry 1976; Coleman 1990:
91; Putnam 1993: 170–1; Sztompka 1996: 43). Trust is built upon imperfect knowledge; the more we know about
others the more we may trust (or distrust) them, but we cannot be certain of our judgement, or it would not involve
trust. In other words, trust involves a leap of faith. Sometimes this faith is rooted in religious teaching and sometimes
in secular ideas, but always it involves personal risk, the unknown, and judgement about the motives and behaviour of
others.
Trust does not involve rational calculation of a tit-for-tat nature in which one good turn is repaid with another of equal
value. Rather it is based upon an assumption that good turns will be repaid at some time in the future, perhaps even by
unknown people (Sahlins 1972). In this way trust and generalized reciprocity are similar, and both are different from
instrumental and rational calculation. Nevertheless trust is not blind; it involves the accumulation and updating of
experience and the modification of trust or distrust according to events (Hardin 1992).
We can put it the other way round and treat trust as a way of reducing risk and uncertainty. In an increasingly risky and
unknown world, trust opens up possibilities for action by providing the basis for risk reduction (Luhmann 1979: 40).
Without trust in those upon whom we depend, daily life would be much more difficult, if not actually impossible, for
everyone but the lawyers, who would make a lot of money. For the rest of us life would be like the British
summer—nasty, brutish, and short. There are social types who are trust-averse and they are called paranoids; for the
rest of us trust helps to make the world go round.
The Origins of Social Trust
Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all the
others. If men are to remain civilized or become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the
same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.
(de Tocqueville 1956: ii. 118)
According to de Tocqueville social trust in nineteenth-century America was bred, if not actually born, in civic
associations, community organizations, and voluntary clubs, and above all in political associations. The state did not
and could not create trust; rather, the democratic state, with its freedom of political association, was built upon trust.
The idea is taken up as a central theme in the social capital theory of Putnam (1993, 1995a, b) who focuses less upon
political associations than on non-political ones such as the choirs and bird-watching associations of Italy, and the
community associations and voluntary organizations of the United States. Particularly important are those voluntary