This article also discusses whether the risk management of Amaranth was sufficient or not, based upon work by Chincarini [2006, 2007]. It is found that although the strategy of Amaranth Advisors may have been a reasonable one, Amaranth leveraged the position significantly, causing the trade to contain a huge amount of market risk. Even with simple market risk measures, it was poised to sustain major losses in a "worst case" scenario. Another source of Amaranth's risk was liquidity risk. In Amaranth's actual spread trades on NYMEX and ICE, it had natural gas futures positions that represented from 80%-125% of the total open interest on the NYMEX. Its NYMEX futures contracts alone represented as much as 60% of the open interest on NYMEX. These trades represented much too large a position with respect to the total open interest on the NYMEX exchange. In some senses, Amaranth was close to the entire market in certain futures contracts. A simple analysis in Chincarini [2006, 2007] showed that the most excessive positions generated the greatest losses in September, indicating a liquidity penalty against Amaranth. Thus, the positions of Amaranth were excessive from a liquidity perspective, which may have explained the additional losses in excess of what a simple VaR measure would have predicted. This also raises important questions for regulators about more transparency in the context of hedge funds' trading positions and the regulation of electronic exchanges such as ICE, as well as, perhaps, a communication between exchanges trading similar products.