INTRODUCTION
Now that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has emerged from
the restructuring of the International Accounting Standards Committees (IASC) board,
it seeks to establish high-quality International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
and to engineer convergence at that level with eight leading national standard setters
via a formal process of liaison.
One obstacle lying in the IASBs path is the set of political pressures that may be
triggered by any board initiative to prescribe specific accounting treatments, eliminate
alternative treatments, impose additional disclosure requirements, or tighten the allowed
interpretations. I define political to mean self-interested considerations or pleadings
by preparers and others that may be detrimental to the interests of investors and
other users, a phenomenon that has been associated with the term economic consequences
(see Zeff 1978). The IASBs initiatives will prescribe acceptable standards with
greater specificity and provide less room for flexibility. Because the European Commission
(EC) has given notice that, no later than 2005, all listed European Union (EU)
companies must adopt endorsed IFRSs in their consolidated statements, EU companies
will see the stakes as being much higher than they were with the standards issued
by the old IASC board. Much depends, of course, on how effectively the several countries
regulators enforce compliance with IFRSs.
This article relates numerous attempts by industry and other affected parties, both
in the U.S. and other countries, to move aggressively to prevent an accounting standard
setter from imposing an objectionable requirement. They exemplify the lengths to which
the powerful critics of proposed standards will go to defend their self-interests.
INTRODUCTION
Now that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has emerged from
the restructuring of the International Accounting Standards Committees (IASC) board,
it seeks to establish high-quality International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
and to engineer convergence at that level with eight leading national standard setters
via a formal process of liaison.
One obstacle lying in the IASBs path is the set of political pressures that may be
triggered by any board initiative to prescribe specific accounting treatments, eliminate
alternative treatments, impose additional disclosure requirements, or tighten the allowed
interpretations. I define political to mean self-interested considerations or pleadings
by preparers and others that may be detrimental to the interests of investors and
other users, a phenomenon that has been associated with the term economic consequences
(see Zeff 1978). The IASBs initiatives will prescribe acceptable standards with
greater specificity and provide less room for flexibility. Because the European Commission
(EC) has given notice that, no later than 2005, all listed European Union (EU)
companies must adopt endorsed IFRSs in their consolidated statements, EU companies
will see the stakes as being much higher than they were with the standards issued
by the old IASC board. Much depends, of course, on how effectively the several countries
regulators enforce compliance with IFRSs.
This article relates numerous attempts by industry and other affected parties, both
in the U.S. and other countries, to move aggressively to prevent an accounting standard
setter from imposing an objectionable requirement. They exemplify the lengths to which
the powerful critics of proposed standards will go to defend their self-interests.
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