In these opening two chapter we will find that the tension between the two conceptions of human dignity mirrors a familiar tension between the claims of autonomy (human dignity as empowerment) and the claims of other social values (human dignity as constraint). Where the tension is most acute, individual choice is either given free rein (the preferences of others notwithstanding), or it is restricted (paternalistically, in the interests of the individual, or defensively for the sake of collective values). So far as bioethics is concerned, these tensions translate in a striking fashion. Where human dignity as empowerment holds court, and autonomy is prioritized, bioethics is organized largely around the notion of informed consent. On the other hand, where human dignity as constraint rules, and either paternalism or social defence prevails, consent (no matter how free or informed) is no longer decisive. Indeed , a fairly dramatic way of expressing the emergence of human dignity as constraint is to say that, in bioethics, it threatens to overtake the ruling paradigm of informed consent.