in the Greek economy over the last forty years. This again highlights the importance of fiscal policy (now both its size and quality) for macroeconomic outcomes.
Finally, notice that the specification in column 2 of Table 4 passes the serial correlation tests. Also, the RESET test for non-linear functional form cannot reject the null of a correct specification. Since the RESET tests of the regressions in columns 1-3 of Table 2 and column 1 of Table 4 reject the null, this adds to our confidence that there is a Laffer curve pattern from fiscal policy to growth, and this pattern is captured by our model specification in column 2 of Table 4.
6. 3 Summary of the section
Is a larger government size, as measured by the government share in GDP, always bad for growth? Although, as reported above, this is the case when one ignores efficiency in the public sector, the results change drastically once we take account of the mix between size and efficiency. Our regressions show that only when our measure of government efficiency deteriorates relative to the previous year, a larger government size is bad for growth. By contrast, when our measure of efficiency improves relative to the previous year, the growth effect of government size is insignificant. It is the significantly negative effects that dominate over time, this is why on average larger sizes were found to hurt growth. Therefore, what really matters to growth is the size-efficiency nexus. This is consistent with the theoretical literature (see e.g. the literature initiated by Barro, 1990) as well as with empirical evidence for a number of countries (see Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos, 2005).
7. Conclusions, limitations and extensions
Is public spending hampering growth? The answer is yes, but not all spending, and not always. Our growth regressions for Greece over 1960-2000 showed that, although a smaller public sector is good for growth, it is necessary to look beyond size; the composition and quality/efficiency of the public sector are equally important.
The general lesson is that Greece needs fiscal rules that ensure overall expenditure contraction and are also complemented with reallocation of funds among expenditure categories and a more efficient use of those reduced funds. The challenge will be to institutionalize these changes.
We close with limitations and possible extensions. First, we have concentrated on growth only. Stability, equality, etc, are other key indicators of macroeconomic
performance. It is thus useful to examine the implications of fiscal-tax policy for those indicators too. Second, it is important to identify the transmission channels through which fiscal-tax policy affects macroeconomic outcomes like growth (see e.g. Baldacci et al., 2004). Crowding out via interest rates, distortion of private incentives, etc, are potential transmission channels. Third, one could also investigate the determinants of large and inefficient government size. Low discount factors, reelection policies, extra rents when in power, etc, are potential determinants (see e.g. Lockwood et al., 2001, for Greece).