b) Intent
i) When a person has knowledge to a substantial certainty that harmful or offensive contact will result from a certain action, a battery occurs if that action is taken, even if there is no intent to cause harm to another. “If the actor knows that the consequences are substantially certain to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.” (Contrast to negligence!)
(1) Vosburg v. Putney: Schoolboy kicks friend in shin in classroom. Due to prior injury, P left w/ even more serious injury. D found liable. The wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him. (Eggshell skull rule.) Court also notes that kicking would have been acceptable in the playground, but in the present case, order had been called by the teacher. Under those circumstances, no implied license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum of the school, and necessarily unlawful.
(2) Garratt v. Dailey: A woman brought suit against her 5 year-old nephew, Brian Dailey, when she was injured in a fall that resulted from his pulling a chair out from beneath her. The Supreme Court ultimately held that Brian was “substantially certain” that his aunt would fall as a result of his moving the chair, and therefore imposed liability.
(3) White v. University of Idaho: Piano professor touched White’s back and unintentionally caused her harmful injuries. HOLDING: Court held that D committed battery despite lack of intent to bruise P. The intent element of the tort of battery does not require a desire or purpose to bring about a specific result or injury; it is satisfied if the actor’s affirmative act causes an intended contact which is not permitted and harmful or offensive.
(4) Keel v. Hainline: D threw an eraser at a fellow student and unintentionally hit her in the eye, causing her to become partially blind in that eye. HOLDING: The fact that an act was done with a good intention, or without any unlawful intention, cannot change that which, by reason of its unlawfulness, is essentially an assault and battery into a lawful act, thereby releasing the aggressor from liability.
ii) Transferred intent
(1) Ex: A intends to punch B, but instead punches C still liable.
(2) Ex: If you intend to commit frighten A by shooting near her (assault) but accidentally shoot C standing nearby have committed battery on C
iii) Not necessary that P knows of contact at the time: if D kisses P while asleep, but does not wake or harm her, D can still be held liable.
iv) An act or omission done or neglected under the influence of pressing danger is considered involuntary.
(1) Laidlaw v. Sage: P claimed that D’s action of shifting their positions relative to each other before a criminal explosion constituted battery, despite the fact that Ds action did not contribute to any part of the injury which P suffered by reason of the explosion. HOLDING: D did not voluntarily interfere with the person of the plaintiff.
c) Causation
i) Act does not need to be the single cause of a harm, merely a but-for cause of the harm.
d) Consent: A battery consists of a touching of a substantially different nature and character than that which the patient consented.
i) Grabowski v. Quigley: P injured his lower back, sought treatment from D (doctor), was operated on but continued to have back pain and developed a “drag” foot as a result of the surgery. P later discovered that a different doctor had conducted a significant portion of his surgery and charged D with battery, for his never consented to the surgery performed by another doctor. HOLDING: In favor of P. The consent of the patient is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his doctor and an operation without the patient’s consent is a technical assault. P alleged sufficient facts to establish a cause of action for battery against D.