William Galston, for instance, maintains that the three most important advocates of the neutral state, Rawls, Dworkin and Ackerman, cannot avoid reference to a substantive theory of the good, which he calls 'rationalist humanism'. He claims that, without acknowledging it, they 'covertly rely on the same triadic theory of the good, which assumes the worth of human existence, the worth of human purposiveness and of fulfilment of human purposes, and the worth of rationality as the chief constraint on social principles and actions'.2 According to Galston, liberals should adopt a 'perfectionisf stance and state openly that liberalism promotes a specific conception of the good and is committed to the pursuit of the ends and virtues that are constitutive of the liberal polity.
While rejecting the solution of perfectionism, many liberals acknowledge the shortcomings of the neutrality thesis as it is usually formulated. This is the case with John Rawls who, in his work subsequent to A Theory of Justice, has dearly distanced himself from the 'priority of the right over the good' type of interpretation which his communitarian critics imputed to him. He now insists that 'Justice as fairness is not proceduraUy neutral. Clearly its principles of justice are substantive and express far more than procedural values, and so do its political conception of person and society, which are represented in the original position/3
William Galston, for instance, maintains that the three most important advocates of the neutral state, Rawls, Dworkin and Ackerman, cannot avoid reference to a substantive theory of the good, which he calls 'rationalist humanism'. He claims that, without acknowledging it, they 'covertly rely on the same triadic theory of the good, which assumes the worth of human existence, the worth of human purposiveness and of fulfilment of human purposes, and the worth of rationality as the chief constraint on social principles and actions'.2 According to Galston, liberals should adopt a 'perfectionisf stance and state openly that liberalism promotes a specific conception of the good and is committed to the pursuit of the ends and virtues that are constitutive of the liberal polity.
While rejecting the solution of perfectionism, many liberals acknowledge the shortcomings of the neutrality thesis as it is usually formulated. This is the case with John Rawls who, in his work subsequent to A Theory of Justice, has dearly distanced himself from the 'priority of the right over the good' type of interpretation which his communitarian critics imputed to him. He now insists that 'Justice as fairness is not proceduraUy neutral. Clearly its principles of justice are substantive and express far more than procedural values, and so do its political conception of person and society, which are represented in the original position/3
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