The question is how to balance the Mathews factors here. It could be argued
that the high risk of the erroneous deprivation of a substantial private interest
would outweigh even this compelling government interest. The second
Mathews factor, however, allows for the consideration of additional procedural
safeguards that would decrease the risk of an erroneous deprivation. 373 As in
Kiareldeen, the Secretary of State could provide a designated organization with
an unclassified summary of its classified information, 374 which would allow the
designated organization to mount at least some sort of defense against the classified
information, materially decreasing the risk of an erroneous deprivation.
Such an unclassified summary should give the designated organization "access
to the decisive evidence to the fullest extent possible, without jeopardizing legitimately
raised national security interests." 375 An unclassified summary is not
without risk to the government interest, 376 but the risk a summary poses to national
security is certainly less than that posed by full disclosure of the classified
information. Notably, the unclassified summary would be created by the Secretary
of State, who is in the best position to know how to both preserve intelligence
sources and protect the classified information from terrorists. Further, the
administrative cost and burden associated with writing unclassified summaries
would not tip the scales against their creation. Given the reduction in the risk of
error that unclassified summaries would entail, the government interest in keeping classified information secret would likely outweigh even a substantial private
interest held by a designated organization and actual classified information
would not itself need to be disclosed. Having read the possibility of unclassified
summaries being made available to designated organizations that seek them into
section 1189, the Secretary of State's use of classified information in making
designations does not offend due process.