July 2, 2011 | 1404 GMT
Thailand's Elections: A New Round of Conflict
PAULA BRONSTEIN/Getty Images
Yingluck Shinawatra and Pheu Thai party members during a rally in
Bangkok on July 1
Summary
The opposition Pheu Thai party of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra is expected to win Thailand's contentious general elections
July 3. If Pheu Thai is deprived of victory, its supporters will likely
return to protests. If it wins, the anti-Thaksin political forces can be
expected to counter by taking legal action against Pheu Thai's top prime
ministerial candidate or by seeking to stir up trouble on the border
with Cambodia. Compounding the political standoff is the potential for a
succession crisis in the monarchy, crises that together threaten to
break the status quo of the past sixty years.
Analysis
With Thailand's fiercely contested general elections to take place July
3, public opinion polls suggest that the opposition Pheu Thai party
leads by a margin of 4 percentage points - and a much wider margin
according to some other polls. STRATFOR does not forecast the outcome of
elections. The fundamental conflicts of interest at the heart of
Thailand's political crisis will remain in place regardless of the
outcome. The elections are important because they mark the start of the
next round of conflict between Thailand's opposing domestic forces.
On the surface, a Pheu Thai victory in this election would rectify the
problem of the previous two elections (2006 and 2007), which saw
victories by the Pheu Thai's predecessors but were nullified by
extra-electoral power plays - a military coup and a judicial coup. If
the Pheu Thai party is somehow deprived of an election win, or prevented
from cobbling together a ruling coalition, then its supporters
(including the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, aka the
Red Shirt movement) will protest and launch a new campaign to claim
their democratic rights. Even with a landslide victory, a new Pheu Thai
government will face the same opposition by powerful institutional
forces - the Thai Privy Council and Royal Army, the palace, the civil
bureaucracy, the courts and opposing parties.
For some time, there have been attempts at forming a Thai-style
compromise that would allow the political elite across the divide to
find a temporary working arrangement. Broadly, such an arrangement would
require excluding any amnesty for exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, while allowing his followers and supporters to rule
government. But at present there seems to be no agreement on such a
deal. Thaksin's appointment of his sister Yingluck as the top prime
ministerial candidate for Pheu Thai has energized the party and other
voters who would like to see Thailand get a fresh face and its first
female prime minister. Since Yingluck is seen as a proxy for Thaksin,
the opposition will not tolerate her; even if it did, it is hard to
believe she could give up on amnesty for Thaksin. Meanwhile, the
anti-Thaksin forces have shown every sign of hardening their position.
Thai army chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, who heads a staunchly royalist
military faction, is viewed as uncompromising and willing to go to great
lengths (even by the Thai military's standards) to prevent pro-Thaksin
forces from attempting to secure amnesty or to undercut Prayuth's or his
faction's influence.
With compromise unlikely, the only question is what lines of attack the
opposing sides will take. Reliable STRATFOR sources suggest that the
most likely outcome is that the Pheu Thai party will win and the leaders
of the elite royalist faction initially will defer their response and
wait. When the time comes, these forces seem likely to use their
advantage in the court system to impede the Pheu Thai politicians,
particularly to try to oust Yingluck on charges of perjury for
statements under oath relating to her shares in the family business
during investigations against Thaksin. Should the courts rule against
her or the party, mass protests could re-emerge, and any mass Red Shirt
uprising against the courts would be framed as a threat to the rule of
law itself and could be used as a pretext for the army to exert greater
influence, or even intervene directly.
Another course of action for the military leadership would be to [IMG]
stir up trouble on the border with Cambodia. Cambodia has been openly
sympathetic to Thaksin and has attempted to take advantage of Thailand's
internal political tumult. But the Thai army maintains its prerogative
for handling the border, both on the tactical level and on the level of
national security strategy and could attempt to play up the Cambodian
threat as a means of destabilizing the government and justifying a more
hands-on approach for itself. As with the flare-ups on the Cambodian
border in late 2008, when the Pheu Thai party's predecessors were in
power, and the recent fighting in 2011, it would be difficult to tell
what was driving the conflict. But the Thai army could attempt to
dictate the response.
Finally, the Yellow Shirts, or People's Alliance for Democracy, appear
weak and disconnected, far less relevant than when they stormed
Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi International Airport in 2008. They have made the
border dispute with Cambodia a major rallying cry but have not garnered
large public support in recent demonstrations. Still, though it may seem
unlikely at present, it is possible that anti-Thaksin forces could move
behind the scenes to rehabilitate the Yellow Shirts or launch another
mass protest movement to attempt to destabilize a pro-Thaksin
government.
As for the pro-Thaksin forces, assuming they rise to power, STRATFOR
sources believe they will try to avoid the appearance of seeking charter
changes and Thaksin's amnesty immediately, and bringing all government
to a halt in the meantime, which they were accused of doing in 2008.
Instead, they may attempt to build legitimacy as a ruling party by
passing legislation and going through the "normal" business of running
the country, without immediately broaching the most irreconcilable
issues. It would also make sense for this group to attempt to use its
democratic credentials to gain international support in a bid to deter
domestic enemies from forcing them from power through non-democratic
means. However, there can be little doubt that the group intends to
clear Thaksin from legal trouble and bring him back into the country,
which is the point at which a clash with the establishment cannot be
deferred.
The reason the opposing forces in the political crisis are becoming more
recalcitrant is most likely the overlapping succession in the monarchy.
This long-term trend poses opportunities and dangers for all major
players. The greatest threat to Thai stability is that a succession
crisis should emerge, based on opposition to Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn, the heir apparent. A struggle within the royalty would
add enormous uncertainty, even if it were not intertwined with the
political crisis - Thaksin has been accused of entertaining designs of
gaining influence over or weakening the palace, while the movement
against the prince is thought to be partially supported by his alleged
ties to Thaksin. A threat to the monarchy, real or perceived, is one
scenario that has a higher probability than others of provoking more
direct intervention by the army into politics, potentially even another
open coup. Rising uncertainty over a potential succession crisis has
made the intensifying political crisis even more volatile and threatens
to break the 60-year-old system, which thus far has survived
considerable political commotion.
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2 กรกฎาคม 2011 | 1404 GMTการเลือกตั้งของไทย: ความขัดแย้งรอบใหม่รูปภาพพอลล่า BRONSTEIN/พอล เก็ตตีสมาชิกพรรค Yingluck ชินวัตรและพรรคเพื่อไทยในระหว่างการชุมนุมในกรุงเทพมหานครในวันที่ 1 กรกฎาคมสรุปฝ่ายค้านพรรค Pheu ไทยของอดีตนายกฯ ทักษิณที่ถูกเนรเทศชินวัตรคาดว่าจะชนะการเลือกตั้งทั่วไปของโต้เถียงของไทย3 กรกฎาคม ถ้าพรรคเพื่อไทยจะปราศจากชัยชนะ พันธมิตรฯ จะมีแนวโน้มกลับไปประท้วง ถ้ามันชนะ กองกำลังทางการเมืองต่อต้านทักษิณได้คาดว่าจะตอบโต้ โดยการดำเนินการตามกฎหมายกับนายกด้านพรรคเพื่อไทยผู้สมัครที่รัฐมนตรีต่างประเทศหรือ โดยการแสวงหาชนวนบนเส้นขอบกับกัมพูชา ทบต้นขัดแย้งทางการเมืองมีศักยภาพในการวิกฤตอย่างต่อเนื่องในสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ วิกฤตที่คุกคามกันไปแบ่งสภาพของหกสิบปีวิเคราะห์กรกฎาคมสถานของประเทศไทยถึงพริกถึงขิงระหว่างทั่วไปเลือกใช้3 สำรวจความเห็นสาธารณะแนะนำว่า พรรคฝ่ายค้านพรรคเพื่อไทยนำทางแค่ 4 จุด - มีขอบกว้างมากตามบางอื่น ๆ สำรวจ STRATFOR คาดการณ์ผลลัพธ์ของเลือกตั้ง พื้นฐานความขัดแย้งของดอกเบี้ยที่วิกฤตทางการเมืองของไทยจะยังคงอยู่ในตำแหน่งไม่ว่าการผลที่ได้ของ เลือกตั้งมีความสำคัญเนื่องจากจะทำเครื่องหมายจุดเริ่มต้นของการรอบต่อไป ของความขัดแย้งระหว่างประเทศแก่กองทัพในประเทศจะแก้เป็นชัยชนะไทยคมในการเลือกตั้งนี้บนพื้นผิว การproblem of the previous two elections (2006 and 2007), which sawvictories by the Pheu Thai's predecessors but were nullified byextra-electoral power plays - a military coup and a judicial coup. Ifthe Pheu Thai party is somehow deprived of an election win, or preventedfrom cobbling together a ruling coalition, then its supporters(including the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, aka theRed Shirt movement) will protest and launch a new campaign to claimtheir democratic rights. Even with a landslide victory, a new Pheu Thaigovernment will face the same opposition by powerful institutionalforces - the Thai Privy Council and Royal Army, the palace, the civilbureaucracy, the courts and opposing parties.For some time, there have been attempts at forming a Thai-stylecompromise that would allow the political elite across the divide tofind a temporary working arrangement. Broadly, such an arrangement wouldrequire excluding any amnesty for exiled former Prime Minister ThaksinShinawatra, while allowing his followers and supporters to rulegovernment. But at present there seems to be no agreement on such adeal. Thaksin's appointment of his sister Yingluck as the top primeministerial candidate for Pheu Thai has energized the party and othervoters who would like to see Thailand get a fresh face and its firstfemale prime minister. Since Yingluck is seen as a proxy for Thaksin,the opposition will not tolerate her; even if it did, it is hard tobelieve she could give up on amnesty for Thaksin. Meanwhile, theanti-Thaksin forces have shown every sign of hardening their position.Thai army chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, who heads a staunchly royalistmilitary faction, is viewed as uncompromising and willing to go to greatlengths (even by the Thai military's standards) to prevent pro-Thaksinforces from attempting to secure amnesty or to undercut Prayuth's or hisfaction's influence.With compromise unlikely, the only question is what lines of attack theopposing sides will take. Reliable STRATFOR sources suggest that themost likely outcome is that the Pheu Thai party will win and the leadersof the elite royalist faction initially will defer their response andwait. When the time comes, these forces seem likely to use theiradvantage in the court system to impede the Pheu Thai politicians,particularly to try to oust Yingluck on charges of perjury forstatements under oath relating to her shares in the family businessduring investigations against Thaksin. Should the courts rule againsther or the party, mass protests could re-emerge, and any mass Red Shirtuprising against the courts would be framed as a threat to the rule oflaw itself and could be used as a pretext for the army to exert greaterinfluence, or even intervene directly.Another course of action for the military leadership would be to [IMG]stir up trouble on the border with Cambodia. Cambodia has been openlysympathetic to Thaksin and has attempted to take advantage of Thailand'sinternal political tumult. But the Thai army maintains its prerogativefor handling the border, both on the tactical level and on the level ofnational security strategy and could attempt to play up the Cambodianthreat as a means of destabilizing the government and justifying a morehands-on approach for itself. As with the flare-ups on the Cambodianborder in late 2008, when the Pheu Thai party's predecessors were inpower, and the recent fighting in 2011, it would be difficult to tellwhat was driving the conflict. But the Thai army could attempt todictate the response.Finally, the Yellow Shirts, or People's Alliance for Democracy, appearweak and disconnected, far less relevant than when they stormedBangkok's Suvarnabhumi International Airport in 2008. They have made theborder dispute with Cambodia a major rallying cry but have not garneredlarge public support in recent demonstrations. Still, though it may seemunlikely at present, it is possible that anti-Thaksin forces could movebehind the scenes to rehabilitate the Yellow Shirts or launch anothermass protest movement to attempt to destabilize a pro-Thaksingovernment.As for the pro-Thaksin forces, assuming they rise to power, STRATFORsources believe they will try to avoid the appearance of seeking charterchanges and Thaksin's amnesty immediately, and bringing all governmentสะดุดหยุดชะงักในขณะเดียวกัน ซึ่งพวกเขาได้ถูกกล่าวหาว่าทำในปี 2008แทน พวกเขาอาจพยายามที่จะสร้างเป็นบุคคลปกครองโดยชอบธรรมผ่านกฎหมายและผ่านการทำธุรกิจ "ปกติ"ประเทศ โดยทันที broaching irreconcilable มากที่สุดปัญหา ก็จะทำให้รู้สึกสำหรับกลุ่มนี้พยายามที่จะใช้มันประจำเพื่อสนับสนุนนานาชาติในการเสนอราคาเพื่อขัดขวางประชาธิปไตยศัตรูภายในประเทศจากการบังคับให้พวกเขาจากพลังงานผ่านไม่ใช่ประชาธิปไตยหมายความว่า อย่างไรก็ตาม สามารถคงที่ได้มีล้างทักษิณจากปัญหากฎหมาย และนำเขากลับเข้ามาในประเทศซึ่งเป็นจุดที่ไม่สามารถปะทะกับสถานประกอบการหรือไม่เลื่อนเวลาออกไปเหตุผลที่กองกำลังฝ่ายตรงข้ามในวิกฤตการณ์ทางการเมืองจะกลายเป็นเพิ่มเติมrecalcitrant ได้ติด ๆ กันทับซ้อนกันในสถาบันแนวโน้มระยะยาวนี้มาสร้างโอกาสและอันตรายสำหรับหลักทั้งหมดผู้เล่น ภัยคุกคามต่อความมั่นคงไทยสุดคือสืบทอดวิกฤตควรเกิด ตามฝ่ายค้านเพื่อเจ้าชายสมเด็จพระบรมโอรสาธิราช ทายาท ต้องต่อสู้ภายในค่าเพิ่มความไม่แน่นอนมาก แม้ว่าจะไม่ได้เจอกับตัววิกฤตทางการเมือง - ทักษิณแล้วถูกกล่าวหาว่าของคลายออกได้รับอิทธิพลมากกว่าหรือวัง ในขณะที่การเคลื่อนไหวลดลงกับเจ้าชายเป็นความคิดที่ได้รับการสนับสนุนบางส่วน โดยเขาถูกกล่าวหาความสัมพันธ์กับทักษิณ เป็นอุปสรรคต่อพระมหากษัตริย์ จริง หรือรับ รู้ เป็นหนึ่งสถานการณ์ที่มีความน่าเป็นสูงกว่าคนอื่นของ provoking เพิ่มเติมตรงแทรกแซงกองทัพเข้าเมือง อาจได้อีกเปิดรัฐประหาร ความไม่แน่นอนสูงขึ้นผ่านวิกฤตอย่างต่อเนื่องอาจเกิดขึ้นได้ทำวิกฤตทางการเมือง intensifying ยิ่งระเหย และข่มขู่ทำลายระบบ 60 ปี ที่มีชีวิตรอดฉะนี้มากการเมืองหลีกหนีความวุ่นวายให้ความคิดอ่านความคิดเห็นในรายงานนี้ อื่น ๆ รายงาน
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