The quantitative effect of judicial efficiency is large. A one-point increase in this index (the difference between Malaysia and Singapore, or slightly larger than the difference between Korea and Taiwan) implies 5–6% less depreciation from the end of 1996 to the end of 1998. The adjusted R-squared is 0.31 without (0.29 with) the East Asia dummy and 0.28 with foreign exchange reserves included in the regression.
Fig. 2 shows corruption on a scale of zero to ten as measured by the International Country Risk Guide and reported by LLSV (1998) for 23 countries. This variable is highly significant and remains so when we include the East Asia dummy. A one-point increase in this index (meaning lower corruption, again approximately the difference between Malaysia and Singapore) implies 5% less depreciation from December 1996 to December 1998. The adjusted R-squared is 0.21 with (0.2 without) the East Asia dummy. When we control for foreign exchange reserves, the corruption variable remains significant at the 6% level and the foreign exchange reserves variable is not significant. The adjusted R-squared rises only slightly to 0.25. If we control for import coverage separately or jointly with reserves, the corruption variable is significant at the 5% level and the macroeconomic control variables are not significan