The neo-Aristotelian position is now a well-established option in the philosophy of
science. It has not swept all before it; there is a good deal of support for versions of most of
the historical alternatives to it, with the exception of pure Humeian regularity theory,
which has very few takers nowadays. The position of David Lewis is the nearest thing to an
influential Humeian approach in philosophy nowadays, although it is not very popular
among philosophers of science.47 Lewis supplements a Humeian attitude to the actual
world with a modal account of causation, explicated in terms of relations to possible
worlds. Bas van Fraassen offers a version of ‘saving the appearances’.48 Dretske, Tooley,
and Armstrong explain scientific truth through appealing to laws of nature, which are
conceived of as contingent relations between universals.49 Prediction of the future of
philosophy is always risky, but there are factors that incline one to think that the neo-
Aristotelian view will continue to thrive. Much of the support for its opposition is still
based on assuming an anti-Aristotelian tradition whose underpinnings have been removed
by historical and philosophical criticism. It is relatively new and in need of further
development, which always attracts philosophers interested in making a name for themselves.
Its long-term success will depend on how well this further development works out,
but we can be confident that the idea of Aristotelian metaphysics as an exploded medieval
illusion will not be revived.