When Congress had debated financial regulatory reform in 2010, it considered imposing government rules on the trading of derivatives. Trading in some kinds of derivatives (particularly those whose value was tied to mortgages), which were largely unregulated at the time, had profoundly destabilized the U.S. and world economies in 2008, and Congress sought to avoid a similar situation in the future. For this reason, it sought to extend government oversight. Unlike stocks and bonds, which were traded on public exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange, most derivative deals were private agreements between two parties. Congress proposed instead that derivatives be traded in public "clearinghouses" run by intermediaries, where regulators could scrutinize these transactions. The big banks, including JPMorgan, had argued vigorously against this, saying that intermediaries could reveal sensitive pricing information or the structure of the deal, potentially benefiting rivals and reducing the banks' profits. But in 2010, Congress decided to extend government regulation over the derivatives market, despite the industry's opposition. In addition to requiring regulated trading through clearinghouses, the Dodd-Frank Act also included a provision called the Volker Rule. This rule, named after a former head Qf the Federal Reserve, Paul Volker, who had suggested it, said that banks could not trade derivatives for their own accounts-something they had commonly done before DoddFrank. The purpose of the rule was to prevent banks from taking on excessive risk by making big bets-and leaving taxpayers on the hook to bail them out if something went seriously wrong, as it had in 2008. An exception was made for derivatives trading done to hedge risk in a bank's own portfolio. In 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission was still trying to figure out exactly how to implement this part of the law-and what exactly a hedging trade was, as opposed to some other kind-so banks were still largely free to do what they wanted. Bank lobbyists were still busy arguing for a loose interpretation of the rule. JPMorgan's huge losses startled both Congress and regulators, and again posed the question of what kinds of regulations were necessary. Many wondered if the bank's (and its shareholders') losses could have been avoided if a strict interpretation of the Volker Rule had already been in effect. "It is premature to conclude whether the Volker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act would have prohibited these trades," said Bryan Hubbard, spokesperson for the U.S. Office of the Comptroller, referring to the fact that the specific rules had not yet been written. Representative Barney Frank, coauthor of the Dodd-Frank Act, commented, "When a supposedly responsible, well-run organization could make such an enormous mistake with derivatives, that really blows up the argument, 'Oh, leave us alone, we don't need you to regulate us."' To Frank, the losses underscored the continuing need for strong government oversight. Weeks later, after an internal investigation by the bank, JPMorgan chief executive officer Jamie Dimon announced that three high-ranking executives were leaving the company: Ina Drew, who ran the risk management unit that was responsible for the company's derivative losses; Achilles Macris, who was in charge of the London-based desk that placed the trades; and Javier Martin-Artajo, a trader and managing director of Macris's team. Dimon also said that the trading positions taken had produced losses that could go as high as $5 billion. Later, others estimated that the losses could be as high as $9 billion. Unlike the banking crisis a few years earlier, these losses would be absorbed by the bank-or its shareholders-and a bailout, which would have passed the costs along to the taxpayers, would not be needed. At the company's annual meeting a few days later, Dimon addressed the issue of increased regulation. While he continued to criticize the cost and complexity of