the index to suit that application. Another limitation is that the implications for detailed entry mode are not elaborated very far. The initial model ‘‘promises’’ implications for detailed entry mode, but the implications are summarily covered in the conclusions. The authors simply note that more control entry modes will be favored when the risk score is high. Aliouche and Schlentrich do not explain how to choose from among the four entry modes: the model is under-specified. The sixth and final paper in Phase 3 is Jell-Ojobor and Windsperger (2013). Although focusing on governance theory, Jell-Ojobor and Windsperger also provide a comprehensive, albeit brief, mini-review of the entire international franchising literature, which is recommended to the reader. The authors develop an integrative framework that investigates the determinants of the international franchising governance modes by combining organizational economics and strategic management perspectives. Specifically, hypotheses are generated from transaction cost theory, agency theory, resource-based and organizational capabilities theory, and property rights theory. Drawing from transaction cost and agency theories, the formal model links three independent factors (i.e., environmental uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, and transaction-specific investments) with four governance modes that are associated with ascending levels of control (i.e., from master franchising, area development franchising, joint venture franchising, to wholly owned subsidiary). Additionally, drawing from resource-based and organizational capability theories, another three independent variables (i.e., system-specific assets, local market assets, and financial assets) are associated with the same four franchising governance modes. From these, a comprehensive model emerges. The hypotheses are developed with considerable help and support from existing literature using the individual theories. The hypotheses make sense. For example, both environmental and behavioral uncertainties lead to a tendency to use lower control modes. Both transactionspecific investments and system-specific assets lead to a tendency to use higher control modes. Greater franchise partner efforts (either financial assets or local market access) favor a tendency to use lower control franchising governance modes. Moderator effects are also added. Jell-Ojobor and Windsperger (2013) provide an effective integration of previous disparate theories. The model is impressive and certainly helpful for the academic in considering a range of pertinent issues. Notwithstanding, despite being more integrated than other studies, even the authors conclude by acknowledging further perspectives not yet included, such as institutional theory, national culture theory, and international strategy theory. One can only sigh at the prospect of adding more complexity to the Jell-Ojobor and Windsperger model.