International politics and the environment
Requiring the stabilization of emissions of some pollutant within 10 years may be more ambitious than one requiring a 50 per cent reduction within five year if the sates in the former all had increasing emission while those in the latter either had already made, or were on emission trajectories that would have lead them to make, large reductions. Thus, an IEA’s ambitiousness is the degree to which states agree to take actions when matched by others that they would not take on their own.
A tradeoff also exists between ambitiousness and participation. Common wisdom suggests that successful negotiation require involving all states that have an interest in problem (Young and Osherenko, 1993b: 16). Yet a set of contingent leaders’ –each of whom is willing to take meaningful action but only if other do – can pursue more ambitious goal if they exclude recalcitrant draggers. Scandinavian states often have established high environmental standards even though other major contributors to the problem are unwilling at least initially to agree to those terms. States may create institutions that address only a fraction of a problem or engage only a fraction of the perpetrators, either because a partial solution is better that no solution or because they believe some initial steps will foster conditions that will lead currently reluctant states to participate. This go it alone power can allow an activist subset of states to reach an agreement despite the opposition of powerful states that are contributing to a problem (Gruber, 2000). Just as the six states that initiated the creation of the European Union did so over strong opposition from the United Kingdom, so too did states bring the Kyoto Protocol into existence despite clear opposition from the United State. Institutions that’ go it alone’ are weaker that they might be but can still allow committed states to initiate international action without being held hostage by powerful dragger states.
IEAs also vary considerably in specificity, with some containing only vague provisions and others detailing pages of rules, requirements, conditions, targets, and timetables. When states are unconcerned or uncertain about how an environmental problem is affecting their interests, they are more likely to generate vague provisions in unambitious agreements. This lack of specificity can arise when a consensus regarding the need for action is not matched by a consensus on what to do. Vague provisions can also arise when states that have not found real compromises respond to pressure to reach an agreement – such as happens at the end of a diplomatic conference – by ‘papering over’ their differences (Mi chell, 2005). But a lack of initial specificity can provide the foundation for greater specificity over time. Thus, the Wetlands Convention