program failed to include provisions for deposit insurance, for managing the performing and nonperforming assets of these and other banks, or for securing and strengthening the rest of the banking system. The closures set off a bank run that began to undermine the rest of the banking system, including healthy banks. In the months that followed, the Indonesian central bank was forced to provide huge lines of credit to keep the banking system liquid. (Some of these loans were apparently made under pressure from the president to support crony banking friends of the Suharto clan). These credits added to the money supplied and helped fuel inflation during the height of the crisis. Critics who argue that this approach was appropriate simply because the banks were in bad shape, or who argue that Indonesia=s mistake was to close too few banks, simply miss the point that the problem was the hurried approach, in a context lacking deposit insurance and a comprehensive and workable financial restructuring plan.8 In the end, all three countries -- Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea -- ended up making blanket promises to back bank deposits, so that the IMF=s initial tough line was in vain in any event. A more effective approach to dealing with the panic was illustrated by Korea=s second IMF program, signed on December 24, 1997. The first IMF program, like its predecessors in Thailand and Indonesia, relied heavily on fiscal and monetary austerity and a closure of banks (in this case, merchant banks, which had less effect on undermining depositor confidence than closing commercial banks as in Indonesia). Within weeks, the financial panic had only intensified, and it was clear the initial approach was failing. The second program eased off on the monetary and fiscal targets, and had as its centerpiece a restructuring of Korean bank loans owed to international banks. For the first time in the Asia crisis, the creditors were finally asked to be involved and make some adjustment. $24 billion in short-term debt falling due in the first quarter of 1998 was rescheduled to 1-3 year bonds. This approach went to the heart of the pressure on the won, and almost immediately the exchange rate began to appreciate and the panic subsided. The restructuring was far from ideal, since the creditors were given even higher interest rates than the original debts carried, and the new bonds were generously guaranteed by the Korean government, but nevertheless it helped stop the panic. 8 See, for example, Goldstein (1997). This suggests a fourth lesson from the Asian crisis: the need for a more formal mechanism for international private debt workouts for emerging economies that ultimately relies more on private funds than IMF bailouts. There are two parallel frameworks from which such a mechanism could draw: domestic bankruptcy proceedings in the industrialized countries, and international workout mechanisms for developing country sovereign debt. Each creates a negotiating framework for debtors and creditors that helps to overcome some of the collective action problems that characterize financial crises. Bankruptcy proceedings have several key components, including (1) a standstill on debt servicing, legitimized by an independent arbitrator (the court); (2) a mechanism for drawing new interim private sector financing; and (3) a system for debt reduction, debt rescheduling, and/or debt-equity conversions. Sovereign debt workout