To put it another way, some parallelists misapprehend the Buddhist doctrine of
dependent co-origination by inferring from it only the emptiness of individuals or of
things and concluding that relations are ultimately real—―more real‖ than beings or
things. Nāgārjuna would certainly negate both beings and relations; that is, he would say
that things are ultimately empty of inherent existence because they arise and perish in
dependence upon each other and therefore, they can conventionally be described as
related to each other. These relations however are empty of inherent existence too and
propositions about them cannot be held as final. This is because we cannot explain
relations whether we conceive of things as separate or as distinct.
To return to our example, we can affirm, conventionally, that human activity has
an impact on the environment, which changes both in essential ways. Yet this sort of
discourse is merely useful for explaining the world, and the emptiness of dependentarising
is the fact that there is ―no more to it than that‖ (Garfield 1995, 122). Ultimately,
humans are neither part of nor apart from nature; as we saw above, they are neither
different nor the same, neither one nor many.92 Our innate tendency to want to establish
something or other as an ultimate truth or reality is precisely the problem that Buddhism
wants to address.
The Utility of Parallelist Discourse in the Light of the Negation of Views
Some parallelists are keen to use science to support their views about oneness and
relatedness, and appear to suggest that the findings of physics are evidence for the truth
of the Buddha‘s claims. At least, this intimation seems to underlie some authors‘
fascination with the view of reality allegedly shared by Buddhism and physics. Yet, the
Buddha‘s spiritual realization was not a scientific understanding of reality, and his
teachings were never meant to become a theory about the world. The later Mahāyāna
sūtras and philosophy were even more explicit about the rejection of all views.
92 As Dr. Simon James points out, even this last formulation ―neither...nor‖ would ultimately be rejected by
the Madhyamaka (personal communication). All further statements to the effect that Mahāyāna Buddhism
would accept neither x, nor y are to be understood as implying the negation of that conjunction too, and the
ineffability of ultimate truth.
149
To put it another way, some parallelists misapprehend the Buddhist doctrine of
dependent co-origination by inferring from it only the emptiness of individuals or of
things and concluding that relations are ultimately real—―more real‖ than beings or
things. Nāgārjuna would certainly negate both beings and relations; that is, he would say
that things are ultimately empty of inherent existence because they arise and perish in
dependence upon each other and therefore, they can conventionally be described as
related to each other. These relations however are empty of inherent existence too and
propositions about them cannot be held as final. This is because we cannot explain
relations whether we conceive of things as separate or as distinct.
To return to our example, we can affirm, conventionally, that human activity has
an impact on the environment, which changes both in essential ways. Yet this sort of
discourse is merely useful for explaining the world, and the emptiness of dependentarising
is the fact that there is ―no more to it than that‖ (Garfield 1995, 122). Ultimately,
humans are neither part of nor apart from nature; as we saw above, they are neither
different nor the same, neither one nor many.92 Our innate tendency to want to establish
something or other as an ultimate truth or reality is precisely the problem that Buddhism
wants to address.
The Utility of Parallelist Discourse in the Light of the Negation of Views
Some parallelists are keen to use science to support their views about oneness and
relatedness, and appear to suggest that the findings of physics are evidence for the truth
of the Buddha‘s claims. At least, this intimation seems to underlie some authors‘
fascination with the view of reality allegedly shared by Buddhism and physics. Yet, the
Buddha‘s spiritual realization was not a scientific understanding of reality, and his
teachings were never meant to become a theory about the world. The later Mahāyāna
sūtras and philosophy were even more explicit about the rejection of all views.
92 As Dr. Simon James points out, even this last formulation ―neither...nor‖ would ultimately be rejected by
the Madhyamaka (personal communication). All further statements to the effect that Mahāyāna Buddhism
would accept neither x, nor y are to be understood as implying the negation of that conjunction too, and the
ineffability of ultimate truth.
149
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