were, the uninstitutionalized precursor of solidarity, it is the "spilling
over" of motivation to conform with the interests or expectations
of alter beyond the boundaries of any institutionalized or agreed
obligation. Collectivity-orientation on the other hand converts this
"propensity" into an institutionalized obligation of the role-expectation.
Then whether the actor "feels like it" or not, he is obligated to
act in ceetain ways and risks the application of negative sanctions
if he does not.
It is exceedingly important to be clear about the relativity of the
concepts of solidarity and collectivity and hence the applicability of
the self-collectivity variable. Only in the limiting case would a collectivity
constitute an aggregate of persons as total individuals—that
of a completely self-subsistent society. The type case is rather the
aggregate as participants in a particular interactive system organized
as a system of complementary roles, i.e., a partial social system.
Therefore, an actor may be a member of as many collectivities as he
has roles—there is no inherent limitation to that number. With
regard to personnel of collectivities it follows that while some may
be completely separate with no overlap, others overlap, with some
members in common, others not, while still others are related as
more and less inclusive collectivities. Thus in this country residents
of a town or city are also residents of a state, and in turn also of the
United States; they thus have the role of "citizen" in each of these
three levels of governmental organization, that is, are members of
all three collectivities.
Every role, so far as it is institutionalized, involves a pattern of
solidarity obligations; it entails, that is, membership in at least one
collectivity. But in the 'particular orientation within the role these
obligations may or may not be involved. The range of orientation
alternatives relative to which they are not invoked is defined by the
concept self-orientation, that where they are invoked by collectivityorientation.
Thus, to take a familiar example, the participants in a
commercial market are members of a collectivity, the state, which
has "rules of law." In their particular orientations to actual or potential
exchange partners, within certain limits, they may be "selforiented,"
for example, with reference to negotiating agreements on
particular prices. But beyond those limits solidarity obligations come