Given that the first manifestation of the crisis was the collapse of the currencies of the Asian countries, monetary policy was a key element of their reform programs. Ironically, the programs have been criticized from both ends of the spectrum: some critics believe that the countries should have raised interest rates even higher in defense of their currencies, while others have argued that the rise in interest rates was the main source of subsequent problems. A number of academics have made the point that, in a recession, the orthodox policy would be to lower interest rates and allow the exchange rate to slide to boost economic activity. But currency depreciation during the crisis was dramatic—for example, the Korean won dropped from less than 1,000 to nearly 2,000 to the dollar in only one month. In such extreme situations, the first priority has to be the stabilization of the exchange rate before a vicious inflationary cycle sets in. If domestic prices are allowed to skyrocket, the monetary tightening required to reestablish price stability is extremely costly.The strategy pursued by the Asian countries was to raise short-term interest rates to arrest the deterioration of their exchange rates and then to gradually reduce interest rates as the exchange rates stabilized. In fact, the initial rise in interest rates was moderate and short lived: in Thailand, short-term rates rose to a peak of 25 percent, and in Korea, to 35 percent, and they stayed at th
ese peaks for only a few days before declining rapidly to their precrisis levels. Furthermore, given the impact of sharp currency depreciation on inflationary expectations, the increase in interest rates was significantly lower in real terms than in nominal terms. Real interest rates (based on the consensus forecast of inflation as a measure of inflationary expectations), which were in the range of 7–8 percent before the crisis, rose briefly to 20–25 percent before dropping sharply. In both countries, real rates were above 15 percent for only two months, and they are presently about zero. At the same time, both the won and the baht appreciated substantially after the initial crisis.
By contrast, Indonesia's initial efforts to stabilize the rupiah failed. But this is the exception that proves the rule. During the first week of Indonesia's program, the authorities engaged in unsterilized intervention and allowed short-term interest rates to double to 30 percent. As a result, the rupiah appreciated sharply. But within two days, contrary to the country's understandings with the IMF, Bank Indonesia cut interest rates back to their initial levels. The subsequent expansion of liquidity, together with strong signals from the highest levels of the government that commitments under the IMF program would not be respected, precipitated the rupiah's plunge. The resulting high inflation necessitated much higher interest rates to reestablish financial stability. The cost of adjustment would have been dramatically lower had the government persevered with its original program.
To be sure, the weakness of the banking and corporate sectors in the Asian countries did constrain the scope for raising interest rates. However, while many critics have pointed to the adverse impact of higher interest rates on domestic borrowers, they have neglected to take into account the impact of currency depreciation on holders of external debt. A precipitous drop in a currency's value raises the burden of external debt on the banking and corporate sectors to an intolerable level and undermines financial stability. Thus, the trade-off between depreciation and interest rate increases shifts drastically in the presence of exchange rate overshooting. Currency depreciation would have a particularly adverse impact for Indonesia and Korea, which have a high ratio of external debt to domestic credit.
The liquidity squeeze in these countries was not just a consequence of high interest rates, because the banks have been reluctant to roll over their credits, given the large volume of their nonperforming loans and the weak position of the corporate sector. It is instructive to note that the credit squeeze has not been alleviated even as interest rates in Korea and Thailand have fallen to well below their precrisis levels. (A clear example of this phenomenon is Japan, where short-term interest rates have been zero for some time, while the economy has been facing a credit crunch.)