The previous definition also has implications for the property structure of the firm and precludes ownership through voting-shares by outsiders to the firm. Nor should firm members become owners of the assets of the firm for a variety of reasons. One is that control should be related to involvement and participation and not ownership. Second, Vanek (1976) shows that LM based on ownership of the assets of the firm is highly inefficient. For a new of expanding firm it may be difficult to obtain the necessary funds; in the successful LMF, retiring members may find it difficult to sell their accumulated share of the firm to young members of the labour force. The property right structure should therefore be split in the following way: the right to manage the assets of the firm and the right to receive the net revenue should be invested with the workers of the firm. Ownership of non-voting assets with a right to a specified return (fixed or variable) should, however, not be restricted to firm member. Moreover, as we shall see later if capital were to be made available by the state without and adequate opportunity cost, a misallocation of a scarce resource would be the result.