Thus, we can find specific characteristic for each sector. Con-struction companies present a positive relationship betweenPVMV/PVST and CFO. However, the results for real estate compa-nies show a strong correlation between real housing price growth(PVMV and PVST) and both accruals and leverage. Therefore, as thebubble develops, CFO increased in construction firms, while realestate companies increased accruals. We can observe in Table 4that, until 2005, the main component of earnings was CFO for con-struction firms. However, for real estate firms, starting in 1999,accruals are much higher than CFO, to the extent that CFO becomesnegative from 2006 on. As indicated by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand(2010) (pp. 354), “when earnings are composed predominantly ofaccruals, they will be less persistent than when earnings are com-posed predominantly of cash flows”. This fact together with theincreasing real estate companies’ leverage lead us to think thateconomic position of these firms was weaker than that of construc-tion enterprises. Gill et al. (2010) indicate that the growth of realestate companies was basically due to a speculative behaviour inthe sector. Specifically, they found that this behaviour was basedon increasing the gross profit margin through land and work inprogress inventories. Thus, it is likely that both CFO and salesgrowth were not associated with housing prices since the profit-ability of this sector was, to a certain extent, artificially obtainedby accruals. Accordingly, we also find that the correlation betweenextraordinary items and the housing price growth rate is positiveand significant.4.3. Relationships between real earnings management andmacroeconomic variablesThe correlations between real earnings management and thefinancial accounting measures are quite similar for both construc-tion and real estate firms (Table 5).Consistent with prior studies, abnormal accruals show a positivecorrelation with R PROCOST and a negative correlation with R CFO.These results may indicate an overproduction strategy directedtowards increasing earnings. In fact, abnormal production costshave a negative relationship with abnormal CFO. Thus, overpro-duction has a positive effect on abnormal accruals and a negativeeffect on abnormal CFO (Roychowdhury, 2006). Likewise, both highleverage and extraordinary items are accompanied by real earningsmanagement practices aimed at increasing earnings. For both typesof companies, the correlation between the level of leverage andabnormal production costs is positive, and the correlation betweenextraordinary items and abnormal production costs is also positive.We also find that the relationship between real earnings man-agement and several performance measures (ROA, cash flow andgrowth of sales) is as expected, that is, real earnings managementincreases when performance decreases.Table 6 shows the relationship between real earnings man-agement and economic activity indicators. For constructioncompanies, we do not find any relationship between them, butreal estate companies exhibit negative correlations between realhousing price growth (PVMV and PVST) and abnormal CFO, as wellas between real housing price growth and abnormal discretionaryexpenses. However, the relationship is positive with abnormalproduction costs. All these results indicate the intention of improv-ing income when housing price growth increases. No relationshipis found between real earnings management and GDP growthrate.Overall, these results reveal that construction and real estatefirms have different strategies in relation to real earnings man-agement. While construction firms do not use real earningsmanagement significantly, real estate companies use them toimprove their income as the bubble develops. This finding indi-cates an apparently aggressive accounting policy applied by realestate firms.4.4. Financial accounting measures and earnings managementvariables in economic downturnsFig. 1 indicates that during 1996 there was a decrease in boththe new housing price and the overall housing price (new and oldbuildings). Similarly, Fig. 1 shows that in 2007 the bonanza periodended. Table 7 shows the financial accounting measures of inter-est in this paper during two recession years: 1996 as last year ofcrisis, and 2007 as the beginning of a downturn. To this end, weapply mean difference tests comparing the accounting informationassociated with the economic downturn with the rest of the years(economic upswing).The results for construction firms indicate that ROA and CFO arelower in recession years compared to other years. Furthermore, in2007, both accruals and earnings management are higher than theother years. This year, construction firms probably noticed somesigns of recession and tried to conceal them through abnormalaccruals.On the other hand, real estate firms show less sign of reces-sion during 1996 compared to 2007. Although ROA is lower duringboth recession years, in 1996, both the magnitude and the direc-tion of abnormal accruals are lower than in other years. In addition,real earnings management is also low compared to other years,so that these practices seek to decrease income. These facts indi-cate that the crisis was not so deep in 1996 for real estate firmsand, since the sample comprises mainly non-listed companies, it islikely that firms are comfortable paying lower taxes. In fact, theirGrowth Added Value (GAV) was already positive in 1996, whereasthat of the construction entities was still negative. Therefore, theyear 1996 was worse for construction firms than for real estatecompanies.In 2007, the recession is serious in real estate firms, as the ROAand the negative growth of sales indicate. However, there is animportant difference with respect to construction firms: the meanleverage has grown from 62% to about 71% as a consequence ofthe bubble period. In these circumstances, 2007 presents both ahigh level of and positive abnormal accruals. Furthermore, abnor-mal discretionary expenses are lower, indicating that firms attemptto increase their income.