Much of the international relations literature concerned with prospects for international monetary reform can be read as a search for an alternative to hegemony as a basis for international monetary stability. Great play is given to the contrast between earlier periods of hegemonic dominance, notably 1890–1914 and 1945–1971, and the nature of the task presently confronting aspiring architects of international monetary institutions in an increasingly multipolar world. In this paper I suggest that hegemonic stability theories are helpful for understanding the relatively smooth operation of the classical gold standardand the early Bretton Woods system, as well as some of the difficulties of the interwar years. At the same time, much of the evidence is difficult to reconcile with the hegemonic stability view. Even when individual countries occupied positions of exceptional prominence in the world economy and that prominence was reflected in the form and functioning of the international monetary system,that system was still fundamentally predicated on international collaboration.Keohane’s notion of “hegemonic cooperation”—that cooperation is required for systemic stability even in periods of hegemonic dominance, although the presence of a hegemon may encourage cooperative behavior—seems directly applicable to international monetary relations. The importance of collaboration is equally apparent in the design of the international monetary system, its operation under normal circumstances, and the management of crises. Despite the usefulness of hegemonic stability theory when applied to short periods and well-defined aspects of international monetary relations, the international monetary system has always been “after hegemony” in the sense that more than a dominant economic power was required to ensure the provision and